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The JWT signature backend was chosen by mutually exclusive cargo features, and Cargo unifies features across a whole resolution, so the choice belonged to the dependency graph rather than to a binary. Two consumers of this crate that need different backends could not coexist: both features end up enabled and jsonwebtoken refuses that combination. Verification now sits behind the `TokenVerifier` hook, alongside the existing AuthDecider / OidcBackend / ExtraRoute seams: - `ProxyServer::with_token_verifier` injects the embedder's own verifier, so a binary that needs a validated module, an HSM, or a verifier it already owns supplies one without deciding for everyone else who links this crate. - `jsonwebtoken` is now an optional dependency behind `builtin_jwt`, implied by `rust_crypto` / `aws_lc_rs`. A consumer that injects a verifier builds with `default-features = false` and links no JWT crypto at all, which also keeps `rsa` (RUSTSEC-2023-0071) out of its graph rather than excusing it. - With no backend and no injected verifier, an `auth.mode: "jwt"` config is rejected at startup naming the way out, instead of accepting every token. - Enabling both backends stays a compile error; enabling neither is now a supported build rather than one. Everything around the signature check is unchanged and verifier-agnostic: route policies, the roles claim, and claim-to-header forwarding all operate on the returned claims. With an injected verifier `auth.jwt` becomes optional and any key source in it is ignored with a warning. On the way through the auth path: the built-in verifier is called directly instead of through the trait object, so the default deployment allocates no boxed future per verification, and the bearer token is now borrowed from the header instead of copied into a String per request. Closes #81 BREAKING CHANGE: `auth::Auth::build` takes the optional verifier as a second argument, and `auth::jwks` is compiled only with the `builtin_jwt` feature.
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📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughThe proxy now supports consumer-injected JWT verification. Built-in JWT verification is optional and remains available through mutually exclusive crypto backends. Outbound TLS configuration is centralized, and authentication tests cover both verifier paths. ChangesJWT verification API and feature wiring
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Change: Feature · Severity of issue fixed: Medium Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Client
participant ProxyServer
participant Auth
participant TokenVerifier
participant Upstream
Client->>ProxyServer: Send bearer token
ProxyServer->>Auth: Build authentication layer
Auth->>TokenVerifier: Verify stripped token
TokenVerifier-->>Auth: Return claims or reject
Auth->>Upstream: Forward authorized request with claims
Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to Consumers copying the injected-verifier example cannot compile it without adding dependencies, and the advisory rationale is outdated. These are localized documentation issues that should be corrected, but they do not block normal runtime operation. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 75.47% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 53 functions across 12 files. (4 skipped: 4 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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In `@deny.toml`:
- Line 27: Update the reason for RustSec advisory RUSTSEC-2023-0071 to replace
the outdated rsa release detail with 0.10.0-rc.18 as the latest pre-release and
0.9.10 as the latest stable release, or remove the version-specific statement
while retaining that no patched release exists.
In `@README.md`:
- Around line 380-382: Update the README example’s dependency stanza to declare
direct dependencies for the used async_trait::async_trait and serde_json::Value
imports, alongside structured-proxy.
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.github/workflows/ci.ymlCargo.tomlREADME.mddeny.tomlsrc/auth/forward.rssrc/auth/jwks.rssrc/auth/mod.rssrc/auth/tests.rssrc/auth/verifier.rssrc/config.rssrc/hooks.rssrc/lib.rssrc/shield/resolve.rssrc/shield/tests.rssrc/tls.rstests/hooks.rs
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- deny.toml: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 names both the latest stable rsa (0.9.10) and the latest pre-release (0.10.0-rc.18) as affected, so say that instead of "latest is 0.10.0-rc" — the point is that waiting for a release candidate is not a plan either. - README: the injected-verifier snippet is a dependency stanza a reader copies, so it declares async-trait and serde_json, which the verifier in the example above it is written with and this crate does not re-export.
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Summary
The JWT signature backend was chosen by mutually exclusive cargo features, and Cargo unifies features across a whole resolution, so the choice belonged to the dependency graph rather than to a binary. Two consumers of this crate that need different backends could not coexist: both features end up enabled and
jsonwebtokenrefuses that combination.Verification now sits behind a
TokenVerifierhook, alongside the existingAuthDecider/OidcBackend/ExtraRouteseams.ProxyServer::with_token_verifierinjects the embedder's own verifier, so a binary that needs a validated module, an HSM, or a verifier it already owns supplies one without deciding for everyone else who links this crate.jsonwebtokenbecomes an optional dependency behindbuiltin_jwt, implied byrust_crypto/aws_lc_rs. A consumer that injects a verifier builds withdefault-features = falseand links no JWT crypto at all.auth.mode: "jwt"config is rejected at startup naming the way out, instead of accepting every token.Everything around the signature check is unchanged and verifier-agnostic: route policies, the roles claim, and claim-to-header forwarding all operate on the returned claims. With an injected verifier
auth.jwtbecomes optional, and any key source left in it is ignored with a warning.auth::jwks::build_tls_configmoved tosrc/tls.rs: the rate-limit service client used it too, so it was never a JWKS concern and must not be gated behind a JWT feature.On option B from the issue
Option B (a feature gating RS*/PS* so
rsaleaves the graph) is not implementable as written:jsonwebtokenhas no per-algorithm features, andrust_cryptopulls the whole RustCrypto bundle includingrsa(see its[features]block). Nothing on this side can split that.Its goal is reached through A instead. A deployment that will not carry RUSTSEC-2023-0071 builds
default-features = falseand injects a verifier: nojsonwebtoken, norsa, nothing to ignore indeny.toml. The advisory ignore stays for the default build, with that escape hatch recorded next to it, and the new CI leg builds the graph that proves it.Performance
Two costs removed from the auth path while it was open:
bearer_tokenborrows from the header instead of copying the token into aStringon every authenticated request.Testing
All three build configurations, each with
clippy -D warnings,cargo nextest run,cargo fmt --check,cargo test --doc:--features redis(default, RustCrypto)--no-default-features --features aws_lc_rs,redis--no-default-features --features redis(injected verifier)Also
cargo deny check advisories(ok) andcargo publish --dry-run.New coverage: the injected verifier decides authentication and its claims drive the role policy and the forwarded identity header; a rejected token is a 401 rather than a pass-through;
auth.jwtmay be omitted entirely; a configured key source does not fail the build when a verifier is injected; a JWT config with no verifier and no backend is rejected; the built-in verifier still requires a key source.tests/hooks.rsdrives the whole surface through the public API with noaxumtype in the embedder's code, like the other hooks.CI gains an
injected_verifierleg. It is what keeps the no-crypto claim honest: anything reaching forjsonwebtokenoutside thebuiltin_jwtgate fails there.Dependencies
Refreshed and verified against the full matrix above (
cargo update;cargo outdated --root-deps-onlyreports everything current). There is no diff to carry:Cargo.lockis in.gitignore, and the version requirements inCargo.tomlalready admit the latest releases.Two follow-ups worth their own issues, deliberately not in this PR: the crate ships a packaged binary, so committing
Cargo.lockwould make release builds reproducible; andserde_yamlis deprecated upstream (0.9.34+deprecatedis its last release) with no advisory yet.Closes #81
BREAKING CHANGE:
auth::Auth::buildtakes the optional verifier as a second argument, andauth::jwksis compiled only with thebuiltin_jwtfeature.