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chore(deps): update dependency undici@>=6.0.0 <6.27.0 to v8.10.2 [security] - #193

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chore(deps): update dependency undici@>=6.0.0 <6.27.0 to v8.10.2 [security]#193
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This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
undici@>=6.0.0 <6.27.0 (source) [8.8.0 → 8.10.2](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/undici@>=6.0.0 <6.27.0/8.8.0/8.10.2) age confidence

undici vulnerable to cross-user information disclosure and parse-time crash via degenerate private cache directives

CVE-2026-13697 / GHSA-4cwx-7wf7-3272

More information

Details

Summary

Two issues in undici's cache interceptor, both fixed by the same patch on lib/util/cache.js:

  1. Shared-cache disclosure: Responses with malformed qualified Cache-Control: private directives such as private="" or private="," can be incorrectly stored in the default shared cache, then served to a later caller with the same cache key.
  2. Parse-time crash: Mixed unqualified-and-qualified private directives in the same header (such as public, max-age=60, private, private="hdr") cause an uncaught TypeError in the cache-control parser, terminating the request.
Impact
Shared-cache disclosure

Applications using interceptors.cache() in shared mode may cache a user-specific response and serve it to a later caller with the same cache key. This can disclose private response bodies and headers, including Set-Cookie.

Required conditions:

  • the cache interceptor is enabled in shared mode, including the default configuration;
  • an upstream returns a malformed directive such as Cache-Control: public, max-age=300, private="";
  • another request later matches the same cache key, without a separating Vary header.
Parse-time crash

Applications using interceptors.cache() against an upstream that returns a Cache-Control header combining unqualified private with qualified private="..." see an uncaught TypeError: output.private.concat is not a function during response handling. The request rejects; depending on the consumer's error handling, the process may exit.

Details

private="" is parsed as { private: [''] }. The shared-cache guard only rejects private === true, so the response can be stored. When served from cache, the previous user's body and headers may be returned to a different user.

For the crash variant, an unqualified private directive sets output.private = true, then a subsequent qualified private="hdr" directive attempts output.private.concat(['hdr']), which throws because boolean has no concat method.

The patch routes the qualified-directive path through a shared helper that normalizes empty-after-trim arrays to true and preserves existing true values, closing both vectors.

Patches

Upgrade to undici 7.29.0 or 8.9.0. Both releases fix the qualified private directive handling that caused the shared-cache storage and the parser crash.

Workarounds

Until patched, avoid shared interceptors.cache() for user-specific responses, use type: 'private', or disable caching for affected origins.

Credit

Disclosure variant reported by @​h0rk1p via HackerOne report #​3817497.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to downstream response desynchronization via retry interceptor

CVE-2026-16728 / GHSA-8xcm-r25x-g524

More information

Details

Impact

Undici's interceptors.retry() can deliver a response whose body length does not match the Content-Length header exposed to the application after a retry or resume of a partial response. Applications that use interceptors.retry() and forward upstream response headers and bodies downstream, for example proxy or gateway applications, may emit an invalid HTTP response with a stale Content-Length header. This can lead to downstream response desynchronization, connection hangs, or response corruption in clients or intermediaries that rely on the forwarded framing metadata.

A malicious or faulty upstream can respond to a range request with a 206 Partial Content response such as:

Content-Range: bytes 0-99/300
Content-Length: 300

and then send only 99 bytes before closing the socket. interceptors.retry() can then retry with Range: bytes=99-99, receive the final byte, and deliver a 100-byte body to the application while the response headers still contain Content-Length: 300 from the first response.

The bug requires interceptors.retry() to be enabled, an upstream that returns a partial response with a mismatched framing header, and a downstream forwarder that does not remove or recalculate Content-Length.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later.

Workarounds
  • Disable interceptors.retry() for untrusted upstreams.
  • Remove or recalculate Content-Length before forwarding a response body assembled or transformed by Undici.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to cookie attribute injection via unsanitized domain and unparsed setCookie fields

CVE-2026-16729 / GHSA-v3r7-h72x-cjcm

More information

Details

Impact

The setCookie function has two attribute injection paths. validateCookieDomain does not reject semicolons (validateCookiePath already does at 0x3B), so a domain value like example.com; SameSite=None lands verbatim as Domain=example.com; SameSite=None. The unparsed array's loop only checks each entry contains = and does not sanitize values, so an entry like X-Custom=val; HttpOnly lands unchanged, injecting HttpOnly without the caller setting cookie.httpOnly = true.

Applications that pass user-controlled input to these fields, typically multi-tenant or reverse-proxy servers that scope session cookies to a tenant-supplied domain, can have SameSite CSRF protections bypassed, Secure or HttpOnly forced or stripped, or the intended SameSite tier overridden.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0.

Workarounds
  • Sanitize domain values against the RFC 1034 letter-digit-hyphen set before passing to setCookie.
  • Do not pass user-controlled data to the unparsed field.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to cross-user information disclosure via whitespace around equals in Cache-Control directives

CVE-2026-14643 / GHSA-jr45-8vmc-qm54

More information

Details

Impact

Undici's cache interceptor mishandles optional whitespace (OWS) placed around the = of a qualified no-cache or private Cache-Control directive, such as no-cache ="authorization" (OWS before =) or no-cache= "authorization" (OWS after =). The parser either drops the directive entirely or stores a field name with literal quote characters, so the downstream cache decisions do not recognize the qualification and the response is stored.

In shared-cache mode, this allows a response containing one user's authenticated data to be served from cache to a subsequent caller, including an unauthenticated caller, when both requests resolve to the same cache key. The impact class is identical to CVE-2026-9678 (GHSA-pr7r-676h-xcf6); this advisory covers the whitespace-around-= bypass that the earlier fix did not normalize.

Affected applications are those that explicitly enable the cache interceptor (interceptors.cache()) in shared mode, forward Authorization headers upstream, and receive cacheable responses with qualified private or no-cache directives whose field-name list is padded with OWS around the =.

Patches

Upgrade to undici v7.29.0 or v8.9.0.

Workarounds

If upgrade is not immediately possible, disable shared-cache mode for traffic that includes Authorization headers, avoid caching responses to authenticated requests, or add Vary: Authorization upstream.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to CRLF Injection via blob-like body 'type' property

CVE-2026-15157 / GHSA-m8rv-5g2x-5cg5

More information

Details

Impact

When an application passes a duck-typed blob-like body to undici's HTTP/1.1 dispatcher (via request(), stream(), pipeline(), or dispatch()) with a .type derived from untrusted input, an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to append arbitrary HTTP headers and potentially smuggle a second request past the upstream.

The vulnerable branch in lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js pushes body.type directly into the outgoing headers with no validation, while every other header path in undici goes through isValidHeaderValue():

} else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null && body.type) {
  headers.push('content-type', body.type)  // bypasses isValidHeaderValue()
}

The bug requires a hand-rolled duck-typed blob object or a Blob subclass with a controlled .type. Native Blob is safe because its constructor strips CRLF from .type. fetch() is unaffected because it validates via the Headers class. Ecosystem consumers that build duck-typed blob shapes from user input include form-data-encoder, formdata-polyfill, and formdata-node.

Same defect class as CVE-2022-35948 (explicit content-type sink, fixed in undici 5.8.2) and CVE-2026-1527 (upgrade option sink, fixed in 6.24.0 / 7.24.0), both closed by adding isValidHeaderValue() on their respective sinks. This branch was missed.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later.

Workarounds
  • Set an explicit, validated content-type header on the request options (skips the vulnerable branch).
  • Use a native Blob (or fetch-blob) instead of a hand-rolled duck-typed object.
  • Reject control characters in the MIME type before assigning it to .type.
  • Use fetch() instead of the non-fetch APIs.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.2 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via unhandled error in WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression

CVE-2026-85024 / GHSA-3wwx-pv8p-q78v

More information

Details

Impact

undici's WebSocket client (including Node.js's bundled globalThis.WebSocket) crashes the entire Node.js process when a remote WebSocket peer sends a permessage-deflate compressed message that crosses the decompressed-payload size limit and then contains a malformed DEFLATE block. In lib/web/websocket/permessage-deflate.js, the size-limit cleanup calls removeAllListeners() on the internal zlib InflateRaw, removing its error listener, but leaves the stream running. The inflater then emits a Z_DATA_ERROR with no listener attached, which Node.js treats as a fatal unhandled error event and terminates the process. Application error/close handlers on the public WebSocket cannot observe or prevent this, because the failing object is the internal InflateRaw.

A malicious or compromised WebSocket server can crash a client with a single connection, unauthenticated and without any application mistake. The attack is asymmetric (about 130 KB on the wire expands past the limit) and can be repeated on reconnect (crash loop).

Affected applications are those using the undici WebSocket client (new WebSocket(...)) or Node.js's bundled globalThis.WebSocket that can be induced to connect to an attacker-controlled or compromised WebSocket endpoint.

Patches

Upgrade to undici v6.28.1, v7.29.1 or v8.10.2.

Workarounds

No workaround is available.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via WebSocketStream unclean close

CVE-2026-85014 / GHSA-rx4f-c7p8-82vq

More information

Details

Impact

undici's WebSocketStream crashes the client process when a WebSocket connection is closed abruptly without a close handshake. On such an unclean close, the internal socket-close handler calls abort() on the writable stream even when the application holds a writer lock. Per the WHATWG Streams standard, aborting a locked stream returns a promise that rejects with a TypeError, and the handler discards that promise. The unobserved rejection surfaces as an unhandledRejection and, under Node.js's default behavior, terminates the process.

A malicious or compromised WebSocket server can crash a client with a single connection teardown (a TCP reset, a proxy teardown, or a protocol-violating frame). Affected applications are those using the WebSocketStream API and writing through a writer, which is the standard way to write.

All releases from undici 7.0.0 are affected. WebSocketStream was introduced in 7.0.0.

Patches

Upgrade to undici v7.29.1 or v8.10.2.

Workarounds

No workaround is available.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to caching and replay of unsafe HTTP method responses

CVE-2026-85008 / GHSA-8436-99hf-9mmv

More information

Details

Impact

undici's interceptors.cache() documents that it caches only safe HTTP methods. However, its internal skip-list is built by subtracting the configured methods from the safe-methods set, so an unsafe method (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) never lands in the skip-list and is looked up against the cache store. Combined with the storage gate (canCacheResponse) having no method check, a heuristically-cacheable response (for example a 404) with an explicit Cache-Control: max-age=... to an unsafe method is stored and replayed on a subsequent identical request. The application's state-changing request never reaches the origin, and undici serves a fabricated response from the cache instead. This occurs with the default configuration (methods: ['GET']), which the public API does not allow widening to unsafe methods, so no application misuse is required; an untrusted origin can trigger it purely through its own response headers.

Patches

Upgrade to 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. The cache interceptor no longer reads from or writes to the cache for unsafe HTTP methods, while still invalidating existing cache entries on successful unsafe requests.

Workarounds

None.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped connect options in BalancedPool

CVE-2026-84961 / GHSA-w293-vg96-wgc3

More information

Details

Impact

undici's BalancedPool passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))) before forwarding them to each per-upstream Pool. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied connect or tls option containing a checkServerIdentity callback (or a custom connector function) is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom checkServerIdentity was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through BalancedPool. Client, Pool, Agent, and RoundRobinPool destructure connect/tls before the clone and are not affected. Only applications that use BalancedPool with a function-valued connect/tls option (such as a custom checkServerIdentity or connector) are affected.

Patches

Upgrade to 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. BalancedPool now preserves the connect and tls options outside the JSON clone, so custom TLS verification callbacks are forwarded to each upstream unchanged.

Workarounds

Use Client, Pool, or Agent instead of BalancedPool for connections that rely on a custom checkServerIdentity or connector, until upgraded.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to cross-user cookie disclosure via Set-Cookie caching in shared caches

CVE-2026-84933 / GHSA-2jfj-6hjv-fm6j

More information

Details

Impact

undici's interceptors.cache() does not handle Set-Cookie in the cache path. In shared-cache mode (type: 'shared', the default), a cacheable response (for example Cache-Control: public, max-age=...) carrying a Set-Cookie header is stored, and the stored Set-Cookie is re-served to a later caller that hits the same cache key. This exposes one user's cookie to another caller and lets an untrusted upstream inject cookies into cached responses served to all subsequent callers, violating RFC 6265 section 7.2 (a shared cache must not store cookies). Applications using the shared cache interceptor against untrusted or multi-user upstreams are affected. Private caches (type: 'private') are not affected.

Patches

Upgrade to 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. In shared-cache mode, undici no longer stores or re-serves responses containing Set-Cookie, including previously cached entries and revalidation paths.

Workarounds

Use a private cache (type: 'private') for per-user responses, or avoid caching responses that set cookies. Applications acting as shared caches should strip Set-Cookie from responses before caching.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to downstream response splitting via retry interceptor

CVE-2026-18540 / GHSA-r53p-7pc4-xj5r

More information

Details

Impact

Undici's interceptors.retry() can resume a request after a partial response and append the resumed bytes to an already partially delivered body, while the application still receives the original response's status and headers. When that response carried a Content-Length, the application can receive a longer body. Applications that forward Undici's status, headers, and body downstream without recalculating framing, for example proxy or gateway applications, may emit a response whose body exceeds the forwarded Content-Length, and the excess bytes can be read as the start of a subsequent HTTP response (downstream response splitting or desynchronization).

For example, a 404 Not Found with Content-Length: 2 that sends one byte then closes can be resumed with an open-ended Range request, and the resumed 206 Partial Content bytes are appended, so the application receives more than two body bytes while still seeing Content-Length: 2. The bug requires interceptors.retry() enabled, an attacker-controlled or faulty upstream, and a downstream forwarder that does not recalculate Content-Length.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.1, v7.29.1, and v8.10.2. Upgrade to one of these or later.

Workarounds
  • Disable interceptors.retry() for untrusted upstreams, or set maxRetries: 0.
  • Remove or recalculate Content-Length before forwarding a response body assembled by Undici.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to response truncation via oversized chunked responses in the dump interceptor

CVE-2026-84947 / GHSA-2gqq-gqf2-x968

More information

Details

Impact

undici's interceptors.dump() reads and discards response bodies up to a configurable maxSize. When a response declares a Content-Length that exceeds maxSize, the request is aborted cleanly. When a response is sent chunked (no Content-Length) and its body exceeds maxSize, it is not aborted: the interceptor ends the response early once the accumulated size reaches maxSize, and continued delivery from the parser triggers an internal assertion that is caught and turned into a request abort and connection tear-down. The application observes a misleading 200 with an empty or truncated body while the connection is disconnected. Any application using the dump interceptor against untrusted or misbehaving upstreams is affected.

Patches

Upgrade to 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. The dump interceptor now enforces maxSize on both the declared and the received body size, aborting the request with a RequestAbortedError instead of returning a truncated response.

Workarounds

None. Avoid using interceptors.dump() with untrusted upstreams until upgraded.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via orphaned RetryHandler response body

CVE-2026-18149 / GHSA-pmjh-fq2x-6v4x

More information

Details

Impact

undici's RetryHandler can leave a response body pending indefinitely. When a retried request receives a non-retryable response after a truncated one, the original response.body held by the application is never settled, so reads such as response.body.text() hang and bodyTimeout does not fire. A malicious server can repeat this to accumulate pending promises and streams, leading to denial of service.

Patches

Patched in undici v7.29.1 and v8.10.2.

Workarounds

Impose an independent request deadline and destroy the response body when it expires. bodyTimeout alone does not prevent this.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via unbounded decompression of compressed responses

CVE-2026-84890 / GHSA-3xpg-4rpp-hhhm

More information

Details

Impact

The interceptors.decompress() interceptor decompresses HTTP response bodies according to the untrusted Content-Encoding header. The number of decompression layers is capped at 5, but the total decompressed output size is not bounded and there is no option to limit it. A malicious or faulty upstream can return a small compressed payload (a compression bomb) that expands to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in client memory, exhausting memory and causing the Node.js process to crash or become unresponsive. Any application using the decompress interceptor to read responses from untrusted or compromised upstreams is affected.

Patches

Upgrade to 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. The interceptor now accepts a maxSize option (default 64 MiB) and rejects responses whose decompressed output exceeds it with a ResponseExceededMaxSizeError.

Workarounds

Once upgraded, set a conservative maxSize on the interceptor. Before upgrading, avoid using interceptors.decompress() with untrusted upstreams, or apply a custom interceptor that enforces a decompressed output size limit.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol

CVE-2026-19534 / GHSA-rfgv-xxqx-mfg5

More information

Details

Impact

The undici WebSocket client throws an uncaught TypeError during the opening handshake when a server's 101 response includes a Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header that the client never requested. The throw occurs in a queueMicrotask callback with no surrounding try/catch, so it propagates as an uncaught exception and terminates the Node.js process. This is a remote, unauthenticated denial of service against any application that opens a WebSocket to an attacker controlled or compromised server, or over a plaintext ws:// connection subject to a machine-in-the-middle. It affects the default new WebSocket(url) usage, where no subprotocol is requested. Per RFC 6455 section 4.1, an unrequested subprotocol must fail the connection, not crash it.

All releases starting at undici 6.7.0 are affected.

Patches

Upgrade to undici 6.28.1, 7.29.1, or 8.10.2.

Workarounds

No workaround is available. The fix must be applied through an upgrade.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

nodejs/undici (undici@>=6.0.0 <6.27.0)

v8.10.2

Compare Source

⚠️ Security fixes
High severity
  • GHSA-vp8m-p9jh-q5pm: cache and deduplication interceptors could use caller-controlled request metadata instead of the authoritative dispatcher origin, enabling cross-origin cache poisoning and data disclosure. Undici now derives interceptor identities from the dispatcher origin and bypasses origin-dependent interceptors when no authoritative origin exists. Fixed by caf6194d.
  • GHSA-w293-vg96-wgc3: BalancedPool could drop function-valued connection options while cloning its configuration, including custom TLS certificate validation callbacks. Undici now preserves connect and legacy tls options when creating upstreams. Fixed by 8f5868fb.
  • GHSA-rfgv-xxqx-mfg5: a WebSocket server could select a subprotocol when none was requested, causing an uncaught TypeError that could terminate the process. Undici now rejects the handshake with protocol error 1002. Fixed by 66e12816.
Medium severity
  • GHSA-3wwx-pv8p-q78v: a malformed permessage-deflate payload exceeding the configured decompression limit could emit an unhandled zlib error and terminate the process. Undici now destroys the inflater after reaching the limit. Fixed by 4411a238.
  • GHSA-rx4f-c7p8-82vq: an unclean WebSocketStream close could create an unobserved rejected promise when its writable stream was locked, potentially terminating the process. Undici now propagates the failure through the retained writable stream controller. Fixed by 662d0ea6.
  • GHSA-2jfj-6hjv-fm6j: shared caches could store and replay responses containing Set-Cookie, disclosing one user's cookies to another caller. Undici now excludes these responses from shared caches, including existing entries and revalidation paths. Fixed by cb75bbb3.
  • GHSA-3xpg-4rpp-hhhm: the decompression interceptor did not bound decoded output, allowing compressed responses to consume excessive memory. Undici now limits every decompression stage to 64 MiB by default and supports a configurable maxSize. Fixed by 7aac7f12.
  • GHSA-pmjh-fq2x-6v4x: a terminal retry failure after response headers were exposed could orphan the original response body, causing consumers to hang indefinitely. Undici now propagates the terminal error to the exposed body. Fixed by e905b5b8.
Low severity
  • GHSA-8436-99hf-9mmv: cache interceptors could store and replay responses to unsafe HTTP methods such as POST or DELETE. Undici now restricts cache reads and writes to safe methods while preserving invalidation by successful unsafe requests. Fixed by 2be07bf9.
  • GHSA-2gqq-gqf2-x968: the dump interceptor could treat an oversized chunked response as successfully truncated when no Content-Length was present. Undici now enforces maxSize against received bytes and aborts oversized responses. Fixed by 6d583124.
  • GHSA-r53p-7pc4-xj5r: the retry interceptor could concatenate a resumed response with inconsistent framing into downstream output, enabling response splitting or corruption. Undici now validates Content-Range against the original response framing before resuming. Fixed by 0160a719.
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@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-undici-=6.0.0-6.27.0-vulnerability branch from bb1607e to d77ebb9 Compare September 29, 2026 02:25
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency undici@>=6.0.0 <6.27.0 to v8.9.0 [security] chore(deps): update dependency undici@>=6.0.0 <6.27.0 to v8.10.2 [security] Sep 29, 2026
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