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chore(deps): update dependency langsmith to v0.8.18 [security] - #2804
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This PR contains the following updates:
0.7.6→0.8.18LangSmith SDK: Streaming token events bypass output redaction
CVE-2026-41182 / GHSA-rr7j-v2q5-chgv
More information
Details
Summary
The LangSmith SDK's output redaction controls (hideOutputs in JS, hide_outputs in Python) do not apply to streaming token events. When an LLM run produces streaming output, each chunk is recorded as a new_token event containing the raw token value. These events bypass the redaction pipeline entirely — prepareRunCreateOrUpdateInputs (JS) and _hide_run_outputs (Python) only process the inputs and outputs fields on a run, never the events array. As a result, applications relying on output redaction to prevent sensitive LLM output from being stored in LangSmith will still leak the full streamed content via run events.
Details
Both JS and Python SDKs are affected. The same pattern exists in both:
traceable.ts:997-1003andtraceable.ts:1044-1050run_helpers.py:1924andrun_helpers.py:1996In both SDKs,
new_tokenevents with rawkwargs.tokenvalues are added during streaming, and the redaction pipeline (hideOutputsin JS,hide_outputsin Python) only processesinputs/outputs— neverevents.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
LangSmith SDK: Public prompt pull deserializes untrusted manifests without trust boundary warning
CVE-2026-45134 / GHSA-3644-q5cj-c5c7
More information
Details
Description
The LangSmith SDK's prompt pull methods (
pull_prompt/pull_prompt_commitin Python,pullPrompt/pullPromptCommitin JS/TS) fetch and deserialize prompt manifests from the LangSmith Hub. These manifests may contain serialized LangChain objects and model configuration that affect runtime behavior. When pulling a public prompt byowner/nameidentifier, the manifest content is controlled by an external party, but prior versions of the SDK did not distinguish this from pulling a prompt within the caller's own organization.Prompt manifests can intentionally configure a model with a custom base URL, default headers, model name, or other constructor arguments. These are supported features, but they also mean the prompt contents should be treated as executable configuration rather than plain text. A prompt can also include serialized LangChain
RunnableorPromptTemplateobjects with attacker-controlled constructor kwargs, or secret references that, ifsecrets_from_envis enabled, read environment variables at deserialization time.Applications are exposed when all of the following are true:
pull_promptorpull_prompt_commit(Python) orpullPromptorpullPromptCommit(JS/TS) with a publicowner/nameprompt identifier.Applications that only pull prompts from their own organization (referenced by name only, without an
owner/prefix) are not affected by the public prompt trust boundary issue described above. However, same-organization prompts carry their own risk. If an attacker gains write access to the organization (for example, through a leakedLANGSMITH_API_KEYor a compromised team member account), they can push a malicious prompt that is pulled and deserialized without any additional warning.Impact
An attacker who publishes a malicious prompt to LangSmith Hub may be able to affect applications that pull that prompt by
owner/name. If the prompt manifest reaches the SDK's deserialization path, the SDK will instantiate the referenced LangChain objects with the attacker-supplied constructor arguments rather than treating the manifest as inert data.Realistic impacts include:
base_url, proxy, or equivalent endpoint-setting parameter. In typical deployments, redirected requests may include prompt contents, system prompts, retrieved context, model parameters, provider credentials, or other secrets and may disclose them to the attacker-controlled endpoint.include_model=Trueis passed, because this expands the allowlist to partner integration classes. This is not the default, but it materially increases risk when pulling prompts from outside the caller's organization.Remediation
The LangSmith SDK now blocks pulling public prompts by
owner/nameby default. Callers must explicitly opt in by passingdangerously_pull_public_prompt=True(Python) ordangerouslyPullPublicPrompt: true(JS/TS) to acknowledge the trust boundary. This flag should only be set after reviewing and trusting the prompt contents, not merely the publishing account.Upgrade to LangSmith SDK Python >= 0.8.0 or JS/TS >= 0.6.0.
Guidance for prompt pull methods
The prompt pull methods (
pull_prompt/pull_prompt_commitin Python,pullPrompt/pullPromptCommitin JS/TS) should be used only with trusted prompts. Do not pull public prompts byowner/namefrom untrusted or unreviewed sources without understanding that the manifest contents will be deserialized and may affect runtime behavior.When pulling prompts that include model configuration (
include_model=Truein Python,includeModel: truein JS/TS), the deserialization allowlist expands to include partner integration classes. Because this mode is not the default and is often unnecessary for third-party prompts, prefer the default (false) when pulling prompts from sources outside your organization.Avoid passing
secrets_from_env=True(Python) when pulling untrusted prompts. This parameter allows prompt manifests to read environment variables during deserialization. Only use it with trusted prompts from your own organization.Same-organization prompts
Prompts pulled from the caller's own organization (referenced by name only, without an
owner/prefix) are not gated by the newdangerously_pull_public_promptflag, but they are not inherently safe. If an attacker gains write access to the organization (for example, through a leakedLANGSMITH_API_KEYor a compromised team member account), they can push a malicious prompt that redirects LLM traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure and may disclose any credentials attached to those requests.The security of same-organization prompts follows a shared responsibility model. The LangSmith SDK enforces trust boundaries for public prompts pulled from external accounts, but it cannot protect against compromised credentials or accounts within the caller's own organization. Securing API keys, managing team member access, and reviewing prompt contents before production deployment are the responsibility of the organization. Organizations should treat prompts as executable configuration and apply the same review and audit practices they would apply to application code.
Credits
First reported by @Moaaz-0x.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
LangSmith SDK: Streaming token events bypass output redaction
CVE-2026-41182 / GHSA-rr7j-v2q5-chgv / PYSEC-2026-2583
More information
Details
Summary
The LangSmith SDK's output redaction controls (hideOutputs in JS, hide_outputs in Python) do not apply to streaming token events. When an LLM run produces streaming output, each chunk is recorded as a new_token event containing the raw token value. These events bypass the redaction pipeline entirely — prepareRunCreateOrUpdateInputs (JS) and _hide_run_outputs (Python) only process the inputs and outputs fields on a run, never the events array. As a result, applications relying on output redaction to prevent sensitive LLM output from being stored in LangSmith will still leak the full streamed content via run events.
Details
Both JS and Python SDKs are affected. The same pattern exists in both:
traceable.ts:997-1003andtraceable.ts:1044-1050run_helpers.py:1924andrun_helpers.py:1996In both SDKs,
new_tokenevents with rawkwargs.tokenvalues are added during streaming, and the redaction pipeline (hideOutputsin JS,hide_outputsin Python) only processesinputs/outputs— neverevents.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
LangSmith SDK: Streaming token events bypass output redaction
CVE-2026-41182 / GHSA-rr7j-v2q5-chgv / PYSEC-2026-2583
More information
Details
Summary
The LangSmith SDK's output redaction controls (hideOutputs in JS, hide_outputs in Python) do not apply to streaming token events. When an LLM run produces streaming output, each chunk is recorded as a new_token event containing the raw token value. These events bypass the redaction pipeline entirely — prepareRunCreateOrUpdateInputs (JS) and _hide_run_outputs (Python) only process the inputs and outputs fields on a run, never the events array. As a result, applications relying on output redaction to prevent sensitive LLM output from being stored in LangSmith will still leak the full streamed content via run events.
Details
Both JS and Python SDKs are affected. The same pattern exists in both:
traceable.ts:997-1003andtraceable.ts:1044-1050run_helpers.py:1924andrun_helpers.py:1996In both SDKs,
new_tokenevents with rawkwargs.tokenvalues are added during streaming, and the redaction pipeline (hideOutputsin JS,hide_outputsin Python) only processesinputs/outputs— neverevents.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
LangSmith SDK: Public prompt pull deserializes untrusted manifests without trust boundary warning
CVE-2026-45134 / GHSA-3644-q5cj-c5c7 / PYSEC-2026-2555 / PYSEC-2026-2560 / PYSEC-2026-2582
More information
Details
Description
The LangSmith SDK's prompt pull methods (
pull_prompt/pull_prompt_commitin Python,pullPrompt/pullPromptCommitin JS/TS) fetch and deserialize prompt manifests from the LangSmith Hub. These manifests may contain serialized LangChain objects and model configuration that affect runtime behavior. When pulling a public prompt byowner/nameidentifier, the manifest content is controlled by an external party, but prior versions of the SDK did not distinguish this from pulling a prompt within the caller's own organization.Prompt manifests can intentionally configure a model with a custom base URL, default headers, model name, or other constructor arguments. These are supported features, but they also mean the prompt contents should be treated as executable configuration rather than plain text. A prompt can also include serialized LangChain
RunnableorPromptTemplateobjects with attacker-controlled constructor kwargs, or secret references that, ifsecrets_from_envis enabled, read environment variables at deserialization time.Applications are exposed when all of the following are true:
pull_promptorpull_prompt_commit(Python) orpullPromptorpullPromptCommit(JS/TS) with a publicowner/nameprompt identifier.Applications that only pull prompts from their own organization (referenced by name only, without an
owner/prefix) are not affected by the public prompt trust boundary issue described above. However, same-organization prompts carry their own risk. If an attacker gains write access to the organization (for example, through a leakedLANGSMITH_API_KEYor a compromised team member account), they can push a malicious prompt that is pulled and deserialized without any additional warning.Impact
An attacker who publishes a malicious prompt to LangSmith Hub may be able to affect applications that pull that prompt by
owner/name. If the prompt manifest reaches the SDK's deserialization path, the SDK will instantiate the referenced LangChain objects with the attacker-supplied constructor arguments rather than treating the manifest as inert data.Realistic impacts include:
base_url, proxy, or equivalent endpoint-setting parameter. In typical deployments, redirected requests may include prompt contents, system prompts, retrieved context, model parameters, provider credentials, or other secrets and may disclose them to the attacker-controlled endpoint.include_model=Trueis passed, because this expands the allowlist to partner integration classes. This is not the default, but it materially increases risk when pulling prompts from outside the caller's organization.Remediation
The LangSmith SDK now blocks pulling public prompts by
owner/nameby default. Callers must explicitly opt in by passingdangerously_pull_public_prompt=True(Python) ordangerouslyPullPublicPrompt: true(JS/TS) to acknowledge the trust boundary. This flag should only be set after reviewing and trusting the prompt contents, not merely the publishing account.Upgrade to LangSmith SDK Python >= 0.8.0 or JS/TS >= 0.6.0.
Guidance for prompt pull methods
The prompt pull methods (
pull_prompt/pull_prompt_commitin Python,pullPrompt/pullPromptCommitin JS/TS) should be used only with trusted prompts. Do not pull public prompts byowner/namefrom untrusted or unreviewed sources without understanding that the manifest contents will be deserialized and may affect runtime behavior.When pulling prompts that include model configuration (
include_model=Truein Python,includeModel: truein JS/TS), the deserialization allowlist expands to include partner integration classes. Because this mode is not the default and is often unnecessary for third-party prompts, prefer the default (false) when pulling prompts from sources outside your organization.Avoid passing
secrets_from_env=True(Python) when pulling untrusted prompts. This parameter allows prompt manifests to read environment variables during deserialization. Only use it with trusted prompts from your own organization.Same-organization prompts
Prompts pulled from the caller's own organization (referenced by name only, without an
owner/prefix) are not gated by the newdangerously_pull_public_promptflag, but they are not inherently safe. If an attacker gains write access to the organization (for example, through a leakedLANGSMITH_API_KEYor a compromised team member account), they can push a malicious prompt that redirects LLM traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure and may disclose any credentials attached to those requests.The security of same-organization prompts follows a shared responsibility model. The LangSmith SDK enforces trust boundaries for public prompts pulled from external accounts, but it cannot protect against compromised credentials or accounts within the caller's own organization. Securing API keys, managing team member access, and reviewing prompt contents before production deployment are the responsibility of the organization. Organizations should treat prompts as executable configuration and apply the same review and audit practices they would apply to application code.
Credits
First reported by @Moaaz-0x.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
LangSmith SDK: Public prompt pull deserializes untrusted manifests without trust boundary warning
CVE-2026-45134 / GHSA-3644-q5cj-c5c7 / PYSEC-2026-2555 / PYSEC-2026-2560 / PYSEC-2026-2582
More information
Details
Description
The LangSmith SDK's prompt pull methods (
pull_prompt/pull_prompt_commitin Python,pullPrompt/pullPromptCommitin JS/TS) fetch and deserialize prompt manifests from the LangSmith Hub. These manifests may contain serialized LangChain objects and model configuration that affect runtime behavior. When pulling a public prompt byowner/nameidentifier, the manifest content is controlled by an external party, but prior versions of the SDK did not distinguish this from pulling a prompt within the caller's own organization.Prompt manifests can intentionally configure a model with a custom base URL, default headers, model name, or other constructor arguments. These are supported features, but they also mean the prompt contents should be treated as executable configuration rather than plain text. A prompt can also include serialized LangChain
RunnableorPromptTemplateobjects with attacker-controlled constructor kwargs, or secret references that, ifsecrets_from_envis enabled, read environment variables at deserialization time.Applications are exposed when all of the following are true:
pull_promptorpull_prompt_commit(Python) orpullPromptorpullPromptCommit(JS/TS) with a publicowner/nameprompt identifier.Applications that only pull prompts from their own organization (referenced by name only, without an
owner/prefix) are not affected by the public prompt trust boundary issue described above. However, same-organization prompts carry their own risk. If an attacker gains write access to the organization (for example, through a leakedLANGSMITH_API_KEYor a compromised team member account), they can push a malicious prompt that is pulled and deserialized without any additional warning.Impact
An attacker who publishes a malicious prompt to LangSmith Hub may be able to affect applications that pull that prompt by
owner/name. If the prompt manifest reaches the SDK's deserialization path, the SDK will instantiate the referenced LangChain objects with the attacker-supplied constructor arguments rather than treating the manifest as inert data.Realistic impacts include:
base_url, proxy, or equivalent endpoint-setting parameter. In typical deployments, redirected requests may include prompt contents, system prompts, retrieved context, model parameters, provider credentials, or other secrets and may disclose them to the attacker-controlled endpoint.include_model=Trueis passed, because this expands the allowlist to partner integration classes. This is not the default, but it materially increases risk when pulling prompts from outside the caller's organization.Remediation
The LangSmith SDK now blocks pulling public prompts by
owner/nameby default. Callers must explicitly opt in by passingdangerously_pull_public_prompt=True(Python) ordangerouslyPullPublicPrompt: true(JS/TS) to acknowledge the trust boundary. This flag should only be set after reviewing and trusting the prompt contents, not merely the publishing account.Upgrade to LangSmith SDK Python >= 0.8.0 or JS/TS >= 0.6.0.
Guidance for prompt pull methods
The prompt pull methods (
pull_prompt/pull_prompt_commitin Python,pullPrompt/pullPromptCommitin JS/TS) should be used only with trusted prompts. Do not pull public prompts byowner/namefrom untrusted or unreviewed sources without understanding that the manifest contents will be deserialized and may affect runtime behavior.When pulling prompts that include model configuration (
include_model=Truein Python,includeModel: truein JS/TS), the deserialization allowlist expands to include partner integration classes. Because this mode is not the default and is often unnecessary for third-party prompts, prefer the default (false) when pulling prompts from sources outside your organization.Avoid passing
secrets_from_env=True(Python) when pulling untrusted prompts. This parameter allows prompt manifests to read environment variables during deserialization. Only use it with trusted prompts from your own organization.Same-organization prompts
Prompts pulled from the caller's own organization (referenced by name only, without an
owner/prefix) are not gated by the newdangerously_pull_public_promptflag, but they are not inherently safe. If an attacker gains write access to the organization (for example, through a leakedLANGSMITH_API_KEYor a compromised team member account), they can push a malicious prompt that redirects LLM traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure and may disclose any credentials attached to those requests.The security of same-organization prompts follows a shared responsibility model. The LangSmith SDK enforces trust boundaries for public prompts pulled from external accounts, but it cannot protect against compromised credentials or accounts within the caller's own organization. Securing API keys, managing team member access, and reviewing prompt contents before production deployment are the responsibility of the organization. Organizations should treat prompts as executable configuration and apply the same review and audit practices they would apply to application code.
Credits
First reported by @Moaaz-0x.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
LangSmith SDK TracingMiddleware: Arbitrary server-side file read
CVE-2026-59152 / GHSA-f4xh-w4cj-qxq8
More information
Details
Summary
An attacker who can send an HTTP request to a server running the LangSmith SDK's
TracingMiddlewarecan cause that server to read an arbitrary file from its local filesystem and upload the contents to LangSmith as a trace attachment. Depending on how the distributed trace system is deployed, triggering a read may not require authentication. Retrieving the contents requires read access to the LangSmith workspace the traces are sent to. The net effect is a trust-boundary crossing: a party with workspace trace-read access (for example a low-privilege workspace member, a contractor, or a compromised teammate account) gains the ability to read files from any server runningTracingMiddleware, a capability outside that workspace's intended trust boundary.Impact
Confidentiality (High): arbitrary read of files accessible to the server process, exposed to anyone with workspace trace-read access.
Details
Two defects combine. A field supplied through a tracing-propagation header was merged into the run without validation, allowing injection of run attributes including attachments (CWE-346). A type check intended to gate filesystem access did not match the type of the decoded input, so the guard never engaged (CWE-843). As a result, an attacker-named file is opened by the server and uploaded as a trace attachment by the background tracing thread (CWE-22).
Who can exploit this
Remediation
Upgrade the Python SDK to
>= 0.8.18.Workarounds
Until upgrading, do not expose
TracingMiddlewareto untrusted HTTP traffic, and limit workspace trace-read access to trusted members.Credits
First reported by @Ryu7zz.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
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