LNSAT is pre-release. Security reports should target current source, Gateway contracts, policy/audit contracts, local persistence, CLI behavior, dependency integrity, and future distribution boundaries.
Security properties in this repository are scoped implementation and test claims, not a warranty, certification, compliance claim, or production-use guarantee. Planned architecture is not an implemented control.
No production hosted runtime is active from this repository. Public documentation or binary distribution endpoints are not operational LNSAT endpoints and grant no Gateway, Control Center, enrollment, or runtime authority.
Report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting. If that link is unavailable, contact repository maintainers privately and do not open a public issue containing vulnerability details.
Do not include raw secrets, credentials, tokens, private keys, customer data, or exploit payloads in public issues.
Pre-release security response is maintainer best-effort; no response-time or remediation SLA exists. Maintainers will prioritize credible authority bypass, secret exposure, evidence tampering, and dependency compromise, coordinate privately while risk remains active, and publish an advisory or release note after a fix when public users may be affected.
High-priority classes:
- Gateway policy bypass;
- approval bypass;
- audit evidence suppression or tampering;
- raw secret echo or storage;
- tenant/project isolation failure;
- capability escalation in clients, modules, installers, or MCP adapters;
- managed instruction, skill, profile, or context substitution;
- universal/provider/model overlay downgrade or origin forgery;
- gatekeeper-model false allow or delegated-role escalation;
- request-context cross-project or tenant leakage;
- extension sandbox escape, ambient credential access, or authority minting;
- CLI/local IPC spoofing or secret exposure through process arguments;
- entitlement state confused with action authority;
- unsigned or unverified artifact promotion;
- hosted-cloud authentication, session, or data-boundary failure.
- protocol downgrade or legacy/modern capability confusion;
- retry, cancellation, outage, or receipt ambiguity treated as action success;
- OAuth, SPIFFE, OTel, Registry, or framework evidence treated as action authority;
- registry digest, provenance, namespace, version, or vulnerability substitution;
- signer-provider request, purpose, identity, algorithm, digest, or lifecycle widening.
Repository checks include a required negative-case ledger and closed-boundary truth check:
npm run security:conformance:check
npm run phase7d:truth:checkRun npm run audit:dependencies:check. The gate rejects every unexpected npm
advisory. Current lock resolves top-level @hono/node-server 2.0.11 and
MCP-nested 1.19.17. The updated
GitHub advisory identifies
2.0.5 and 1.19.15 as first patched versions. Current registry audit reports no
vulnerability or active allowance.
The obsolete compatibility allowance has been removed. The evaluator rejects
every package in any nonempty vulnerability object, always returns an empty
allowedAdvisories list, and does not load package-lock.json for exception
matching. The former advisory remains only as a negative test fixture that must
reject both @hono/node-server and @modelcontextprotocol/node. Any new
advisory fails CI.
CI also runs npm run audit:signatures:check after a lifecycle-script-disabled
clean install. The wrapper validates npm's signature-audit JSON schema and
rejects every invalid or missing registry signature before source checks run.
Audit subprocess output is untrusted input. The wrapper does not reflect raw registry stderr, package names, signature-report values, or process-start details. Malformed JSON, unsupported schemas, nonzero npm exits, process-start failures, any vulnerability, and any invalid or missing signature fail with a bounded public-safe diagnostic.
The experimental P10-A3 lnsatctl health and lnsatctl status source uses an
explicit Unix-domain socket on macOS and Linux. It does not select a default
socket or send its bearer through TCP, HTTP URLs, DNS, proxies, redirects,
discovery, retries, or remote transports.
Before transmitting request bytes or the bearer, the client requires:
- one absolute, bounded, normalized UTF-8 socket path;
- a canonical parent path with no symlink traversal;
- parent mode
0700and socket mode0600; - parent and socket ownership by the effective user;
- a non-symlink socket file with stable device, inode, owner, and mode; and
- a connected peer whose effective user matches the client.
The daemon independently rejects an unequal peer effective user before reading
request bytes. The session token is accepted only through stdin and is
zeroized after request construction. GET and HEAD use equal authentication
and authorization; HEAD returns the same declared content length without a
body. Missing, malformed, expired, revoked, unreadable, or unauthorized session
evidence produces one generic denial and does not reflect secrets or paths.
These are scoped source-and-test claims. Windows named pipes, remote administration, supported installation paths, service lifecycle, and production deployment remain unimplemented and unsupported.
Public development does not weaken source or release boundaries. Protected
main changes require a pull request, strict configured source checks, and
resolved review conversations. Required approval count is zero so a sole
maintainer can integrate an owner-authored pull request after its checks pass;
contributor pull requests remain maintainer-controlled through repository write
permissions. Independent review is requested when an eligible reviewer exists
and remains mandatory for any later packet that explicitly requires independent
evidence, but its absence does not deadlock ordinary pre-release source work.
Green CI satisfies the source-check gate; it does not create release, publication, deployment, or production authority. Maintainers do not bypass required status checks, force-push protected history, or treat repository visibility as release approval.
GitHub-hosted settings live outside this source tree and must be reverified at each consequential gate. At this document update, the public repository has vulnerability alerts, Dependabot security updates, dependency-graph generation, secret scanning, and push protection enabled. Those settings provide defense in depth; source checks remain fail-closed when provider state is unavailable or cannot be proven.
Current and planned controls are deliberately distinct:
| Area | Current source or repository control | Remaining gate before supported release |
|---|---|---|
| npm | Exact Node/npm engines, lockfile installs, lifecycle scripts disabled in CI, strict peer dependencies, SHA-512 registry integrity, signature audit, and zero-tolerance vulnerability audit | Keep registry audit schemas and trusted-publishing/provenance policy current |
| Cargo | Pinned Rust toolchain, Cargo.lock, crates.io checksums, no Git dependencies, and locked fetch |
Add pinned, checksum-verified cargo-deny advisory, license, and source-policy enforcement plus an expiring exception ledger |
| FastMCP/Python | Exact direct FastMCP 3 and 4 profile pins, isolated disposable virtual environments, and no production dependency claim | Select an exact Python patch and OS/architecture matrix, then commit complete transitive --require-hashes locks for both profiles |
| Dependency automation | Vulnerability alerts and security updates enabled in the public repository | Add bounded weekly npm, Cargo, pip, and GitHub Actions update configuration without auto-merge, private registries, or broad grouping |
| Package publication | Every npm workspace is private and no source claim grants namespace ownership or publication authority | Prove authenticated @lnsat/* namespace ownership, package-name availability, 2FA or trusted publishing, provenance, and release approval in Phase 14 |
Until the Cargo and Python gates are implemented, lockfile review and current advisory checks are evidence snapshots, not continuous proof. Exceptions must be exact, owned, time-bounded, removal-triggered, and fail closed on expiry or schema drift. No dependency tool may install globally, mutate a production environment, consume unreviewed credentials, or download and execute an unverified installer.
Good-faith testing is welcome when it does not access systems, accounts, data, or infrastructure not owned by the reporter. Do not perform denial-of-service, social engineering, destructive testing, persistence, exfiltration, or live Cloudflare/GitHub/package-registry mutation.
Before stable artifact release, every promoted artifact must have:
- source ref;
- checksum;
- signing status;
- SBOM status;
- provenance status;
- support window;
- rollback or disablement path;
- approval evidence.
Public repository visibility alone does not satisfy any release-security item. See public source readiness for history, privacy, license, GitHub metadata, and source-cutover gates.