Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability. Instead, report it privately:
- Preferred: use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on the Security tab.
- By email: lnorton89@gmail.com. If you encrypt, ask for a key first; otherwise plain text is fine.
Include what you found, how to reproduce it, and which version or commit you tested against. Reports are acknowledged within a few days, and fixes land in the next release.
Only the latest release is supported. Fixes ship in a new release; there is no backport window for older versions.
Rustaman inspects and controls processes on the machine it runs on. Ending, suspending, or reprioritising a process you asked it to is the product, not a vulnerability, and neither is the fact that running it as administrator lets it act on other users' processes — that is what administrator means.
What is in scope:
- Acting on the wrong process. Every action is addressed by
(pid, creation_time)and re-verified immediately before it is carried out, precisely so a PID reused between the click and the call cannot redirect a kill. A way around that check is a real finding. - Misuse of an
unsafeblock. The whole Win32 surface is hand-wrapped insrc/win/; a handle leak, a missing bounds check on a variable-length system structure, or a struct layout that disagrees with what the kernel writes all belong here. - Privilege handling.
SeDebugPrivilegeis enabled once at startup when available and never re-enabled per action; anything that widens what an unelevated instance can do is in scope. - Untrusted input reaching a privileged path. Process names, command lines, service display names, and startup-entry values are all attacker- influenced strings that this app reads and displays.
Everything else — bug reports, feature requests, and questions — belongs on
the issue tracker; see
CONTRIBUTING.md.