fix: Remove cwd-based binary discovery from icp CLI wrapper - #781
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The
icpCLI wrapper locates the platform-specific native executable by checking a hardcoded sequence of paths. The final fallback path is constructed usingpath.join(process.cwd(), 'node_modules', packageName, 'bin', binaryName). If the intended binary is not found in the earlier paths (which can happen frequently under package managers likepnpmthat heavily utilize symlinks, or if optional dependencies failed to install), the CLI wrapper falls back to resolving the executable relative to the current working directory.This creates an untrusted search path vulnerability (analogous to including
.in thePATHenvironment variable). If an attacker convinces a victim to execute the globally installedicpcommand from within a malicious repository containing a planted binary atnode_modules/@icp-sdk/icp-cli-<platform>-<arch>/bin/icp, the wrapper will silently execute the attacker-controlled binary with the victim's privileges.