Unaudited. The interface signs mainnet transactions and moves real funds.

The frontend and the quoting library never take custody. Swaps execute through routers deployed and audited by Uniswap, Aerodrome and the V2 forks. No approval is granted to any contract belonging to this project, because this project has no contract deployed. The minimum-output floor is enforced on-chain by the venue's router.

The realistic worst case from a bug in this repository is a bad quote: the router recommends a venue that is not the best one, or displays an output the trade does not achieve. The floor still holds, because the floor is not ours to break.

contracts/src/SplitRouter.sol would take custody mid-trade. It is not deployed, and should not be deployed without an audit.

• Single-hop routing only; multi-hop liquidity is invisible to the solver.
• Quotes reflect the block they were read at. Between quote and inclusion the price can move; that is what the slippage floor is for.
• Transactions go to the public mempool. No private relay, no MEV protection.
• Fee-on-transfer tokens are unsupported and will quote high.
• Public RPC endpoints can be stale or rate-limited. A stale quote produces a worse fill, bounded by the floor.

Open an issue for anything that does not involve funds at risk.

For a vulnerability that could cost someone money, do not open a public issue. Report it privately through GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" on the Security tab. Include the affected file, the conditions, and what an attacker gains. Expect an acknowledgement within 72 hours.

Since nothing here is deployed and nothing custodies funds, the plausible severity ceiling is a mispriced route rather than a loss of principal. A finding that breaks that assumption is exactly the one worth reporting.