This project's core claim is deterministic, verifiable execution. If you find a way to break that — a result that does not correspond to a real execution, a quorum/dispute bypass, a panic reachable by an unauthenticated peer, or an emulator correctness bug (any deviation from RV64IMC semantics as validated by the QEMU differential and the official riscv-tests suite) — that is a security issue.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository (Security → Report a vulnerability). Please do not open a public issue for anything matching the above.

• crates/rvcore — the emulator: determinism contract, ISA semantics, ELF loading, tohost/syscall devices.
• crates/coordinator — quorum counting, signature verification, admission proof-of-work, dispute/ledger logic, network handling.
• crates/wire — framing, TLS handling, peer protocol.
• crates/worker, crates/contentstore — blob verification and materialization (path confinement, hash checks).

See docs/DESIGN.md ("Known gaps" and the honest-scope notes): bonds are ledger bookkeeping rather than escrowed stake, the coordinator is trusted for worker selection, and the zk tier's verified receipt is demonstrated at the nano-job envelope. Reports within those documented limits are welcome but the limitation itself is known.

Only main at the latest green CI run is supported.