Skip to content
Merged
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
23 changes: 23 additions & 0 deletions docs/changelog.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -19,6 +19,29 @@ docstring gives: it is a record, not a claim about now.

## 2026-11-16

- **`eden`'s first collection, and how it was really done.** The rebuilt
guest held an empty graph (1 node, 0 edges) until a SharpHound run was
ingested on 2026-11-16: 370 nodes and 3,914 edges — 48 users, 73 groups,
the 6 domain computers, 14 OUs, 5 GPOs and the domain. `build-the-bloodhound-guest.md`
§7 now records the three things the run hit, none of which the old three-line
step mentioned:
- **Collected from `carbuncle` as `AD\acooper`**, a population user
(#449) whose password `population-credentials.yml` prints on `phoenix`,
signed in at the console because a plain user is not in *Remote Desktop
Users*.
- **Defender quarantines SharpHound through AMSI**, as the assembly loads,
so a folder exclusion does not help; a process exclusion or turning
real-time protection off for the run in the Windows Security UI does. The
detection was left in place: SharpHound caught on a workstation, logged
against the user, is the SOC event #266 is built to raise.
- **The network collectors cannot work here.** `bloodhound-ce-python` and
`netexec` both authenticate as `acooper`, but the DCs enforce LDAP signing
and have no LDAPS certificate (the lab runs no AD CS): signing refuses
plain LDAP and `636` has no cert, so neither collects. SharpHound on a
domain host is the only path, because the Windows LDAP client signs and
seals over `389`. The zip was carried to a Hicks workstation to upload,
since the UI answers Hicks alone.

- **No clone of template 901 puts its user in `lxd`.** A second live
re-check of `eden` found `garnet` in the `lxd` group, from the default
user groups in Ubuntu's `/etc/cloud/cloud.cfg`. LXD is not installed on
Expand Down
63 changes: 58 additions & 5 deletions docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -383,16 +383,69 @@ containers to come back. They have `restart: unless-stopped`.
it sits in `.env` and in the container's environment, which anyone in
the `docker` group can read, and must not stay the live login.
2. **A collection, ingested.** Download SharpHound from the UI, under
*Download Collectors*. That way its version is the one the server's schema
expects. Run it from a domain-joined host as an ordinary domain user, for
example from `carbuncle`:
*Download Collectors*, so its version is the one the server's schema
expects. The UI answers Hicks only (`403` from VLAN 30, §6), so download it
on a Hicks workstation and carry it to `carbuncle`: `scp` it through
`phoenix` to `Administrator@10.0.30.54` (phoenix's `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`
reaches every guest as the built-in Administrator; `carbuncle` is VMID 154).
Run it there as an ordinary domain user:

```powershell
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --domain ad.matrix.elysium --zipfilename eden-first.zip
```

Then upload the zip under *Administration → File Ingest*. The job must
finish **Complete**, not *Partially Complete*.
The user is any of the population (#449), say `AD\acooper`. Its password is
printed on `phoenix`, never stored — but `population-credentials.yml` reads
`ansible.cfg` and the `LAB_POPULATION_SEED` it derives the password from
from the checkout's `ansible/` directory, so run it from there with the
proxmox env exported, as `ansible/README.md` sets up:

```bash
set -a; . ~/.config/proxmox/phoenix.env; set +a
cd ansible
ansible-playbook population-credentials.yml -e population_only=acooper
```

The earlier repo-root shell will not find the playbook. Sign in at
`carbuncle`'s console (Proxmox, VMID 154): RDP is off on all six guests, so
a domain user has no remote session to use.

Three things the first run (2026-11-16) hit, so a later one need not:

- **Defender quarantines SharpHound through AMSI**, as it loads, not on
disk — so a folder exclusion does not help; a process exclusion for
`SharpHound.exe`, or turning real-time protection off for the run in the
Windows Security UI, does. `AD\acooper` is an ordinary user and cannot
change Defender: make the change elevated as the endpoint's local
administrator `labadmin` (its password is `LAB_ENDPOINT_ADMIN_PASSWORD`),
then run SharpHound back in `acooper`'s own session. Tamper Protection
means this is a UI action, not a `Set-MpPreference` one. **Leave the
detection in place**: SharpHound caught on a workstation, logged against
the user, is the event the SOC side of the lab exists to raise (#266),
not something to clear. Afterwards undo exactly what you changed —
re-enable real-time protection, and if you added the process exclusion,
remove it, because re-enabling protection does not clear an exclusion.
- **The network collectors do not work here.** `bloodhound-ce-python` and
`netexec` authenticate, but both DCs enforce LDAP signing and have no
LDAPS certificate (the lab runs no AD CS), so neither can collect:
signing refuses plain LDAP, and `636` has no cert. SharpHound on a
domain host is the only path, because the Windows LDAP client signs and
seals over `389` natively. Do not re-walk the Linux route.
- **Getting the zip to the UI.** `carbuncle`'s own browser cannot upload
(Hicks only, above), and RDP is off, so pull the zip off `carbuncle` from
`phoenix` with `scp` as the built-in Administrator — `acooper` has no SSH
key, phoenix's `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` does — then carry it to a Hicks
workstation and upload it there. From the checkout root on `phoenix`:

```bash
scp -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -o UserKnownHostsFile=ansible/.known_hosts \
Administrator@10.0.30.54:'C:/Users/acooper/eden-first.zip' .
```

Upload the zip under *Administration → File Ingest*. The job must finish
**Complete**, not *Partially Complete*. Then delete every copy of the zip:
it is a map of the domain's weaknesses, and the audit counts none outside
`/srv/bloodhound-data`.
3. **A graph with edges in it.** In *Explore*, search
`DOMAIN ADMINS@AD.MATRIX.ELYSIUM` and open *Members*. Then run the
pre-built query *Shortest paths to Domain Admins*. Before #449's
Expand Down
Loading