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test(profiling-ffi): add experimental allocation-failure chaos harness - #2907

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@gleocadie

@gleocadie gleocadie commented Nov 20, 2026 •

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What does this PR do?

Experimental, test-only harness to find the profiling FFI paths that crash when an allocation fails (the allocator returns null). Draft: not meant to be merged as is. No production allocation-path changes.

Step 1: ScopedFailingAllocator (global allocator of the allocation_failure test binary only), controller/worker, contract tests and toy scenarios.

Step 2: ddog_Vec_Tag_push in one-shot and sticky modes, for an empty vector, a vector at capacity, and a long key and value. Every ordinal aborts. The report records the stack and the owned call site, the innermost libdatadog frame that allocates:

  • libdd-common-ffi/src/tags.rs:39 and :40, the key and value clones
  • libdd-common/src/tag.rs:230, format! in Tag::new
  • libdd-common-ffi/src/vec.rs:112, infallible Vec::push (called from tags.rs:43)

Step 3: arena allocators behind the non-default allocation-chaos-test feature. ChaosAllocator wraps logical requests (ArenaRequest) and backing-chunk growth (ArenaBacking) and shares the harness policy and event counter. StringTable, Set and SliceSet use that arena only when the feature is on; a production build keeps ChainAllocator<VirtualAllocator>. Scenarios: first insertion, insertion from spare capacity, exact chunk exhaustion, growth to a new chunk, and an item larger than the chunk hint, plus a first insertion through each of the three collections. Every ordinal returns an out-of-memory error.

Crash outcomes are findings: they are recorded and do not fail the test. A nondeterministic trace does.

Motivation

Find every path in the profiling FFI used by the .NET profiler where an allocation failure causes a crash, panic, abort, hang or leak instead of an out-of-memory error. The findings report (later step) is the input for the fix tickets.

Additional Notes

Next steps: the profile and exporter lifecycle, release isolation, coverage-guided scenario discovery, and FINDINGS.md. Per-scenario reports are written to $CARGO_TARGET_TMPDIR/allocation_failure/ and merged into that file at the last step.

Workers disable core dumps (they abort on purpose). cargo build -p libdd-profiling-ffi does not enable allocation-chaos-test; the integration test does, through its dev-dependency.

How to test the change?

cargo nextest run -p libdd-profiling-ffi --test allocation_failure

Local validation on Linux aarch64, debug and release. Windows and macOS were not run locally (CI only).

Jira: PROF-16808

Experimental test-only harness: a global allocator proxy that returns null at a chosen
allocation ordinal, a controller that runs one worker process per ordinal and mode, and
strict contract and toy-scenario tests.

Jira: PROF-16808
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📚 Documentation Check Results

⚠️ 1337 documentation warning(s) found

📦 libdd-profiling-ffi - 729 warning(s)

📦 libdd-profiling - 608 warning(s)


Updated: 2026-11-20 14:44:39 UTC | Commit: 44323e2 | missing-docs job results

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🔒 Cargo Deny Results

⚠️ 50 issue(s) found, showing only errors (advisories, bans, sources)

📦 libdd-profiling-ffi - 25 error(s)

Show output
info: syncing channel updates for 1.91.1-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
info: latest update on 2025-11-10 for version 1.91.1 (ed61e7d7e 2025-11-07)
info: downloading 6 components
warn: the missing active toolchain `1.91.1-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu` has been auto-installed
warn: this might cause rustup commands to take longer time to finish than expected
info: you may opt out with `RUSTUP_AUTO_INSTALL=0` or `rustup set auto-install disable`
error[unsound]: `Bitmap::try_from(&[u8])` can create invalid values
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:17:1
   │
17 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ The `TryFrom<&[u8]>` implementation for `Bitmap<SIZE>` copies the input bytes
     into an uninitialized backing store and calls `assume_init()` without
     validating that the bytes form a valid value of the backing store type. For
     `SIZE = 1` the backing store is a `bool`, so any input byte other than `0x00`
     or `0x01` produces an invalid value, which is immediate undefined behavior.
     
     The `AsMut<[u8]>` implementation has the same problem, as it allows safe code
     to write invalid bit patterns into the backing store through the returned slice.
     
     No fixed version is available, as the crate is unmaintained; its GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps/issues/35
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0

error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/3597
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/3613
   ├ 1 dependent has version requirements that preclude updating:
   ├ hickory-resolver = 0.25.2
   ├   - hickory-proto = '^0.25'
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[unmaintained]: bitmaps is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:17:1
   │
17 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ The bitmaps crate is unmaintained; all versions are affected. The GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
     
     Recommended alternatives:
     
     * [fixedbitset](https://crates.io/crates/fixedbitset)
     * [bitvec](https://crates.io/crates/bitvec)
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0

error[vulnerability]: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:196:1
    │
196 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0285
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0285
    ├ Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
      when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
      a plaintext `EncryptedExtensions` message packed into the same record as the
      `ServerHello` was accepted.
      
      RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes,
      and that implementations terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message"
      alert if they do.
      
      The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker
      cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that
      a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext
      without rustls rejecting the connection.
      
      This is functionally the same bug as Go's
      [GO-2026-4340](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4340) (CVE-2025-61730).
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3265
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.45 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: `Debug` impls for client session values expose TLS secrets
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:196:1
    │
196 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0346
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0346
    ├ The `Debug` implementations of `Tls12ClientSessionValue` and
      `Tls13ClientSessionValue` were derived, and so included the TLS 1.2 master
      secret or TLS 1.3 resumption PSK in their output.
      
      Custom `ClientSessionStore` implementations that format these values with
      `Debug` (for example, when logging) could disclose these secrets to readers of
      the logs. This conflicts with rustls's
      [key-material redaction policy](https://github.com/rustls/rustls/blob/99f2358cae2954837dbb866faf6727de75489ab9/SECURITY.md#boundary-public-api).
      
      Ordinary connection and built-in session cache `Debug` output is redacted and
      is not affected.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3299
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.46 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Brotli certificate decompression can allocate up to 1 GiB before authentication
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:196:1
    │
196 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0348
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0348
    ├ The built-in Brotli certificate decompressor (enabled by the non-default
      `brotli` crate feature) bounded the size of the decompressed output, but
      accepted a peer-selected history window. Brotli's large-window extension was
      enabled, so a five-byte header could cause an allocation of 1 GiB. A peer can
      abort a process whose allocator cannot satisfy that request.
      
      No trusted certificate is required by the attacker. Affected configurations are:
      
      - clients that enable the `brotli` feature and connect to a malicious server, and
      - servers that enable the `brotli` feature and request client certificates.
      
      Applications that do not enable the `brotli` feature are not affected.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3297
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.46 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:196:1
    │
196 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0349
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0349
    ├ The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server
      name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated.
      This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos
      to that server name.
      
      A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello
      selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that
      name carry only an X25519 key share, while `supported_groups` still lists
      X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than
      sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake
      completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as
      long as the entry stays in the client's session store.
      
      The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections
      ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no
      authentication bypass.
      
      The following are not affected:
      
      - connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group,
      - clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and
      - other server names.
      
      This behaviour is discussed in
      [draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction-01.html#name-security-considerations),
      so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3355
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.46 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │   │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │   │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[unsound]: `AsyncFd::new` and related constructors violate I/O safety
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:243:1
    │
243 │ tokio 1.49.0 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0386
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0386
    ├ `tokio::io::unix::AsyncFd` provides safe constructors (`new`, `with_interest`, `try_new`, and `try_with_interest`) that accept any `T: AsRawFd` rather than requiring proof of ownership or validity of the file descriptor. Because `RawFd` implements `AsRawFd`, safe code can construct an `AsyncFd` from an arbitrary or closed file descriptor, or close/replace the underlying file descriptor while the `AsyncFd` is still alive.
      
      This violates I/O safety in two ways:
      
      1. `AsyncFd<T>` implements `AsFd` for all `T: AsRawFd` by calling `BorrowedFd::borrow_raw(self.as_raw_fd())`, allowing safe code to obtain an arbitrary `BorrowedFd<'_>` without owning the file descriptor.
      2. Tokio's I/O driver stores a pointer to an internal allocation in the `epoll`/`kqueue` user data for registered file descriptors. If the underlying file descriptor is duplicated and then closed while an `AsyncFd` is alive, and the OS reuses that file descriptor number for a another IO resource on the same runtime, dropping the first `AsyncFd` deregisters the reused file descriptor number and frees the first while the original file description remains registered in `epoll`, leading to a use-after-free when a readiness event fires.
      
      Starting in Tokio 1.51.6, 1.53.3, and 1.54.0, `AsyncFd::new`, `AsyncFd::with_interest`, `AsyncFd::try_new`, and `AsyncFd::try_with_interest` are deprecated in favor of the `unsafe` constructors `AsyncFd::register` and `AsyncFd::register_with_interest`. Callers must ensure that the file descriptor remains valid, open, and unchanged for the lifetime of the `AsyncFd`.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/tokio-rs/tokio/pull/8587
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=1.51.6, <1.52.0 OR >=1.53.3 (try `cargo update -p tokio`)
    ├ tokio v1.49.0
      ├── hickory-proto v0.25.2
      │   └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
      │       └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │           ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │           │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │           │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
      │           │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │           └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── hickory-resolver v0.25.2 (*)
      ├── hyper v1.11.1
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   ├── hyper-util v0.1.17
      │   │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-common-ffi v51.0.0
      │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      ├── hyper-util v0.1.17 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │   ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── tokio-util v0.7.12
      │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── (dev) tools v51.0.0
      │   ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      └── tower v0.5.2
          ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
          └── tower-http v0.6.8
              └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Panic on a malformed `alpn` value when parsing SVCB or HTTPS records from text
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0487
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0487
   ├ When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, the `alpn` service parameter value is split into a list of protocol names. That step called `expect` on the result, on the assumption that it could not fail. A malformed value, such as one with an unbalanced quote (`alpn="h`), two commas in a row or an invalid escape, makes it fail, so the parser panicked instead of returning an error.
     
     Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.
     
     The fix returns a parse error instead. It is in 0.26.2.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/80eaf9e79f7561e2bc1cf5b89eaba7fd25de3284
   ├ 1 dependent has version requirements that preclude updating:
   ├ hickory-resolver = 0.25.2
   ├   - hickory-proto = '^0.25'
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Panic when an SVCB or HTTPS parameter value is a single quote character
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0489
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0489
   ├ When an SVCB or HTTPS record is parsed from its text (zone file) form, surrounding double quotes are removed from each service parameter value by checking that the value starts and ends with `"` and slicing off the first and last character. A value that is a single `"` (for example `alpn="`) passes that check, and the slice `[1..0]` panics.
     
     Code that parses zone files or record text from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service. Records decoded from the DNS wire format are not parsed this way.
     
     The fix rejects a lone quote character with a parse error before the slice. It is in 0.26.2.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/c663b60a4b4b98deb45d16ccbf10ce2f76cd88a9
   ├ 1 dependent has version requirements that preclude updating:
   ├ hickory-resolver = 0.25.2
   ├   - hickory-proto = '^0.25'
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Zone file lexer panics on a token of 4096 or more characters
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0490
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0490
   ├ The zone file lexer read each token in a loop capped at 4,096 iterations, with an `assert!` on the loop counter as a safety bound. A single token long enough to reach that bound, for example a very long name or character string in a zone file, triggered the assertion and the parser panicked instead of returning the token or an error.
     
     Code that parses zone files from an untrusted source can be made to panic, which is a denial of service.
     
     The fix removes the iteration bound, so the lexer ends only when it reaches the end of a token or an error. It is in 0.26.2.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/0494e15c88fba612f9ecb4f013eb3b221822c867
   ├ 1 dependent has version requirements that preclude updating:
   ├ hickory-resolver = 0.25.2
   ├   - hickory-proto = '^0.25'
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Memory amplification from record counts in the DNS message header
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0491
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0491
   ├ When a DNS message is decoded, the vectors for the question, answer, authority and additional sections were created with `Vec::with_capacity` set to the counts in the message header. Those counts come from the sender and are not checked against the size of the message, so a single small packet that claims 65,535 records makes the decoder reserve memory for that many records (about 18 MB, according to the upstream advisory) before it reads any record and fails.
     
     Any code that decodes untrusted DNS messages is exposed. That includes servers, and clients and resolvers that receive spoofed responses. Repeated packets can drive memory use up and cause a denial of service.
     
     The fix caps the initial capacity at 8 entries and lets the vectors grow as records are actually decoded. It is in 0.26.2.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/280c0e5c4e3002d73ba0762835ef82272d1d33a6
   ├ 1 dependent has version requirements that preclude updating:
   ├ hickory-resolver = 0.25.2
   ├   - hickory-proto = '^0.25'
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Inverted NSEC3 comparison in DNSSEC validation (hickory-proto 0.25)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0504
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0504
   ├ In hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, DNSSEC validation handled the last NSEC3 record of a zone's hash chain with its two comparisons reversed. That record was treated as covering almost every hash it does not cover, so an attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay it, with its RRSIG, to forge proofs that existing names have no records.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in hickory-proto 0.25 (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor 0.25) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/87ee4f81aa9689d81847770d3a74e13982c9bcdc
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 owner names not checked against the zone in DNSSEC validation (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0505
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0505
   ├ Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation matched NSEC3 records to a name only by the hashed first label of the NSEC3 owner name, without checking that the rest of the owner name was the zone in question. A signed NSEC3 record from any zone the attacker controls could therefore be used, by someone who can answer or modify DNS responses, to prove that a name in another zone does not exist.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/10840b8432feb08d369f82e2bb6ce99ae23d7afa
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0511
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0511
   ├ Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/bfbe7ede4021965526f065be9b415945ce575e29
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: DNSSEC validation accepted an unrelated signed RRset as the answer (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0512
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0512
   ├ Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation treated a response with a non-empty answer section as a positive answer if its records validated, without checking that any of them matched the queried name and type. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could return a genuine signed RRset for another name or type and have it accepted as a validated answer.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/77ec9c5d2e9481a0753bbaf1be3cd5175d300cff
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: `Resolver::lookup` and `lookup_ip` returned records that failed DNSSEC validation
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:89:1
   │
89 │ hickory-resolver 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0514
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0514
   ├ With DNSSEC validation enabled, `Resolver::lookup()` and `Resolver::lookup_ip()` returned `Ok` with the records even when validation found the response bogus. The result was only visible in each record's proof status, which callers had to inspect themselves.
     
     Applications that enable validation and treat a successful lookup as validated data would therefore accept forged or tampered answers from anyone who can answer or modify their DNS traffic.
     
     From 0.26.2 a lookup whose records are bogus fails with a "DNSSEC validation failed" error (`DnsError::DnssecBogus`), the error is not retried, and the hickory-server forwarder answers SERVFAIL for it.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/30720f4fb22e5556ecbf26d2c8274ea4a9fdd238
   ├ 1 dependent has version requirements that preclude updating:
   ├ reqwest = 0.13.2
   ├   - hickory-resolver = '^0.25'
   ├ hickory-resolver v0.25.2
     └── reqwest v0.13.2
         ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
         │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
         │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
         └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Parent-side NSEC at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0530
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0530
   ├ Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted the NSEC record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names below the zone cut, or other types at the cut, do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/2e3c829ea45000b1c409a64a03bd422618372471
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Child-side NSEC or NSEC3 record accepted as proof that a delegation has no DS record (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0531
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0531
   ├ Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation accepted an NSEC or NSEC3 record from the child side of a zone cut, which has the SOA bit set, as proof that the parent has no DS record for the delegation (RFC 4035 section 5.2, RFC 6840 section 4.4). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could make a secure delegation look insecure and then forge records in the child zone.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/ec98851f4d175d97b61701bc539523ff63ddbb00
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Parent-side NSEC3 at a zone cut accepted as proof of nonexistence (hickory-proto 0.25)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0532
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0532
   ├ In hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, NSEC3 validation picked the closest encloser by hashed owner name alone and accepted the NSEC3 record that a parent zone signs at a delegation as proof that names at or below the zone cut do not exist. Such a record only proves that no DS record exists there (RFC 6840 section 4.1, RFC 5155 section 8.3). Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay the parent's genuine signed records to get a denial for an existing name in the child zone accepted as secure.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in hickory-proto 0.25 (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor 0.25) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/889801333d7f18d59a4468100e8cd1859e083d43
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[unmaintained]: chrono is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:36:1
   │
36 │ chrono 0.4.38 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0543
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0543
   ├ The chrono crate is unmaintained; all versions are affected.
     
     Recommended alternatives:
     
     - [jiff](https://crates.io/crates/jiff)
     - [time](https://crates.io/crates/time)
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/chronotope/chrono/issues/1768
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ chrono v0.4.38
     ├── libdd-common-ffi v51.0.0
     │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
         └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 NODATA at a zone apex accepted without an NSEC3 record matching the query name (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0549
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0549
   ├ In hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, NSEC3 NODATA validation returned a secure result for a query at the zone apex even when no NSEC3 record in the response matched the hash of the query name, which RFC 5155 section 8.5 requires. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay any genuine signed NSEC3 record from the zone with the zone's signed SOA record and get a denial of any record type at the apex accepted as secure.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in hickory-proto 0.25 or 0.26.0-alpha.1 (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/ffdfb295d1abaad42df126c8cdd924cac74b81c0
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0550
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0550
   ├ Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/68cb330eb7e73a7db0cec9a25888db9f4bcf2086
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Records with a DNS class other than the query's marked secure without being validated (hickory-proto)
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:88:1
   │
88 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0551
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0551
   ├ Before 0.26.0-beta.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation ignored the DNS class when grouping records into RRsets and left records of a class other than IN out of signature checking, then marked them secure if the IN records validated. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could add forged records of another class, including a DS record, and have them returned as validated.
     
     From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/d5349ba13a2bd356239c39a6cc9caa10abe06c55
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             │   │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok

📦 libdd-profiling - 25 error(s)

Show output
error[unsound]: `Bitmap::try_from(&[u8])` can create invalid values
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:16:1
   │
16 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0167
   ├ The `TryFrom<&[u8]>` implementation for `Bitmap<SIZE>` copies the input bytes
     into an uninitialized backing store and calls `assume_init()` without
     validating that the bytes form a valid value of the backing store type. For
     `SIZE = 1` the backing store is a `bool`, so any input byte other than `0x00`
     or `0x01` produces an invalid value, which is immediate undefined behavior.
     
     The `AsMut<[u8]>` implementation has the same problem, as it allows safe code
     to write invalid bit patterns into the backing store through the returned slice.
     
     No fixed version is available, as the crate is unmaintained; its GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps/issues/35
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0

error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:82:1
   │
82 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
   ├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
     `DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
     list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
     QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
     candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
     is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
     terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
     `Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
     
     The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
     resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
     `dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
     triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
     section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
     QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
     this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
     boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
     condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
     validation.
     
     A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
     abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
     compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
     process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
     can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
     exhaust memory on a release-built one.
     
     The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
     the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
     `DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
     0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/3597
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:82:1
   │
82 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
   ├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
     labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
     The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
     
     A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
     and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
     attacks.
     
     This is similar to
     [CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
     
     We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/3613
   ├ 1 dependent has version requirements that preclude updating:
   ├ hickory-resolver = 0.25.2
   ├   - hickory-proto = '^0.25'
   ├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
     └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
         └── reqwest v0.13.2
             ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
             │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
             └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)

error[unmaintained]: bitmaps is unmaintained
   ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:16:1
   │
16 │ bitmaps 3.2.1 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
   │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unmaintained advisory detected
   │
   ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0247
   ├ The bitmaps crate is unmaintained; all versions are affected. The GitHub
     repository was archived by the owner on 2026-05-03.
     
     Recommended alternatives:
     
     * [fixedbitset](https://crates.io/crates/fixedbitset)
     * [bitvec](https://crates.io/crates/bitvec)
   ├ Announcement: https://github.com/bodil/bitmaps
   ├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
   ├ bitmaps v3.2.1
     └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0

error[vulnerability]: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:188:1
    │
188 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0285
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0285
    ├ Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
      when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
      a plaintext `EncryptedExtensions` message packed into the same record as the
      `ServerHello` was accepted.
      
      RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes,
      and that implementations terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message"
      alert if they do.
      
      The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker
      cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that
      a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext
      without rustls rejecting the connection.
      
      This is functionally the same bug as Go's
      [GO-2026-4340](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4340) (CVE-2025-61730).
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3265
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.45 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │       │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: `Debug` impls for client session values expose TLS secrets
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:188:1
    │
188 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0346
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0346
    ├ The `Debug` implementations of `Tls12ClientSessionValue` and
      `Tls13ClientSessionValue` were derived, and so included the TLS 1.2 master
      secret or TLS 1.3 resumption PSK in their output.
      
      Custom `ClientSessionStore` implementations that format these values with
      `Debug` (for example, when logging) could disclose these secrets to readers of
      the logs. This conflicts with rustls's
      [key-material redaction policy](https://github.com/rustls/rustls/blob/99f2358cae2954837dbb866faf6727de75489ab9/SECURITY.md#boundary-public-api).
      
      Ordinary connection and built-in session cache `Debug` output is redacted and
      is not affected.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3299
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.46 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │       │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Brotli certificate decompression can allocate up to 1 GiB before authentication
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:188:1
    │
188 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0348
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0348
    ├ The built-in Brotli certificate decompressor (enabled by the non-default
      `brotli` crate feature) bounded the size of the decompressed output, but
      accepted a peer-selected history window. Brotli's large-window extension was
      enabled, so a five-byte header could cause an allocation of 1 GiB. A peer can
      abort a process whose allocator cannot satisfy that request.
      
      No trusted certificate is required by the attacker. Affected configurations are:
      
      - clients that enable the `brotli` feature and connect to a malicious server, and
      - servers that enable the `brotli` feature and request client certificates.
      
      Applications that do not enable the `brotli` feature are not affected.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3297
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.46 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │       │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[vulnerability]: Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:188:1
    │
188 │ rustls 0.23.37 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0349
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0349
    ├ The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server
      name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated.
      This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos
      to that server name.
      
      A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello
      selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that
      name carry only an X25519 key share, while `supported_groups` still lists
      X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than
      sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake
      completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as
      long as the entry stays in the client's session store.
      
      The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections
      ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no
      authentication bypass.
      
      The following are not affected:
      
      - connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group,
      - clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and
      - other server names.
      
      This behaviour is discussed in
      [draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction-01.html#name-security-considerations),
      so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3355
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.23.46 (try `cargo update -p rustls`)
    ├ rustls v0.23.37
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │       ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │       │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │       └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
          ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
          ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
          └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)

error[unsound]: `AsyncFd::new` and related constructors violate I/O safety
    ┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:234:1
    │
234 │ tokio 1.49.0 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
    │ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
    │
    ├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0386
    ├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0386
    ├ `tokio::io::unix::AsyncFd` provides safe constructors (`new`, `with_interest`, `try_new`, and `try_with_interest`) that accept any `T: AsRawFd` rather than requiring proof of ownership or validity of the file descriptor. Because `RawFd` implements `AsRawFd`, safe code can construct an `AsyncFd` from an arbitrary or closed file descriptor, or close/replace the underlying file descriptor while the `AsyncFd` is still alive.
      
      This violates I/O safety in two ways:
      
      1. `AsyncFd<T>` implements `AsFd` for all `T: AsRawFd` by calling `BorrowedFd::borrow_raw(self.as_raw_fd())`, allowing safe code to obtain an arbitrary `BorrowedFd<'_>` without owning the file descriptor.
      2. Tokio's I/O driver stores a pointer to an internal allocation in the `epoll`/`kqueue` user data for registered file descriptors. If the underlying file descriptor is duplicated and then closed while an `AsyncFd` is alive, and the OS reuses that file descriptor number for a another IO resource on the same runtime, dropping the first `AsyncFd` deregisters the reused file descriptor number and frees the first while the original file description remains registered in `epoll`, leading to a use-after-free when a readiness event fires.
      
      Starting in Tokio 1.51.6, 1.53.3, and 1.54.0, `AsyncFd::new`, `AsyncFd::with_interest`, `AsyncFd::try_new`, and `AsyncFd::try_with_interest` are deprecated in favor of the `unsafe` constructors `AsyncFd::register` and `AsyncFd::register_with_interest`. Callers must ensure that the file descriptor remains valid, open, and unchanged for the lifetime of the `AsyncFd`.
    ├ Announcement: https://github.com/tokio-rs/tokio/pull/8587
    ├ Solution: Upgrade to >=1.51.6, <1.52.0 OR >=1.53.3 (try `cargo update -p tokio`)
    ├ tokio v1.49.0
      ├── hickory-proto v0.25.2
      │   └── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
      │       └── reqwest v0.13.2
      │           ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0
      │           │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
      │           └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── hickory-resolver v0.25.2 (*)
      ├── hyper v1.11.1
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   ├── hyper-util v0.1.17
      │   │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │   │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      │   ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      ├── hyper-util v0.1.17 (*)
      ├── libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
      │   ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
      │   ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
      ├── tokio-util v0.7.12
      │   └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
      ├── (dev) tools v51.0.0
      │   ├── (dev) libdd-networking v1.0.0 (*)
      │   └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (...*[Comment body truncated]*

@pr-commenter

pr-commenter Bot commented Nov 20, 2026 •

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Benchmarks

Comparison

Benchmark execution time: 2026-11-20 13:53:02

Comparing candidate commit 2abe6fe in PR branch gleocadie/PROF-16808-alloc-chaos-pilot with baseline commit 396d962 in branch main.

📊 Benchmarking dashboard

Found 0 performance improvements and 5 performance regressions! Performance is the same for 163 metrics, 9 unstable metrics.

Explanation

This is an A/B test comparing a candidate commit's performance against that of a baseline commit. Performance changes are noted in the tables below as:

  • 🟩 = significantly better candidate vs. baseline
  • 🟥 = significantly worse candidate vs. baseline

We compute a confidence interval (CI) over the relative difference of means between metrics from the candidate and baseline commits, considering the baseline as the reference.

If the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD), the change is considered significant.

Feel free to reach out to #apm-benchmarking-platform on Slack if you have any questions.

More details about the CI and significant changes

You can imagine this CI as a range of values that is likely to contain the true difference of means between the candidate and baseline commits.

CIs of the difference of means are often centered around 0%, because often changes are not that big:

---------------------------------(------|---^--------)-------------------------------->
                              -0.6%    0%  0.3%     +1.2%
                                 |          |        |
         lower bound of the CI --'          |        |
sample mean (center of the CI) -------------'        |
         upper bound of the CI ----------------------'

As described above, a change is considered significant if the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD).

For instance, for an execution time metric, this confidence interval indicates a significantly worse performance:

----------------------------------------|---------|---(---------^---------)---------->
                                       0%        1%  1.3%      2.2%      3.1%
                                                  |   |         |         |
       significant impact threshold --------------'   |         |         |
                      lower bound of CI --------------'         |         |
       sample mean (center of the CI) --------------------------'         |
                      upper bound of CI ----------------------------------'

scenario:span_pool_v1/wall_time/1x10/pooled

  • 🟥 execution_time [+96.201ns; +99.222ns] or [+5.565%; +5.740%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-314315.924op/s; -304774.766op/s] or [-5.433%; -5.269%]

scenario:span_pool_v1/wall_time/20x100/allocating

  • 🟥 execution_time [+77.251µs; +77.403µs] or [+13.191%; +13.217%]
  • 🟥 throughput [-398723.965op/s; -397936.917op/s] or [-11.675%; -11.652%]

scenario:vec_map/as_deduped_map/needs_dedup_1_in_10/128

  • 🟥 execution_time [+188.166ns; +190.922ns] or [+8.046%; +8.164%]

Unstable benchmarks

These benchmarks have a confidence interval too wide to call a change; treat them as noise rather than signal.

scenario:obfuscate_span/cc=false rules=false/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.001ns; +0.001ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:span_pool/allocated_bytes/1x10/pooled

  • unstable execution_time [-240.432ns; +1207.408ns] or [-17.581%; +88.290%]
  • unstable throughput [-4917096.782op/s; +827526.507op/s] or [-56.849%; +9.567%]

scenario:span_pool/allocated_bytes/20x100/pooled

  • unstable execution_time [-101.084µs; +178.444µs] or [-6.994%; +12.346%]
  • unstable throughput [-149249.530op/s; +114332.579op/s] or [-10.746%; +8.232%]

scenario:span_pool_v1/allocated_bytes/1x10/pooled

  • unstable execution_time [-191.595ns; +721.917ns] or [-12.406%; +46.743%]
  • unstable throughput [-3187768.000op/s; +722285.011op/s] or [-44.185%; +10.011%]

scenario:span_pool_v1/allocated_bytes/20x100/pooled

  • unstable execution_time [-147.889µs; +34.809µs] or [-10.652%; +2.507%]
  • unstable throughput [-45444.569op/s; +157633.503op/s] or [-3.132%; +10.864%]
Benchmark execution time: 2026-11-20 13:53:50

Comparing candidate commit 2abe6fe in PR branch gleocadie/PROF-16808-alloc-chaos-pilot with baseline commit 396d962 in branch main.

📊 Benchmarking dashboard

Found 2 performance improvements and 0 performance regressions! Performance is the same for 104 metrics, 0 unstable metrics.

Explanation

This is an A/B test comparing a candidate commit's performance against that of a baseline commit. Performance changes are noted in the tables below as:

  • 🟩 = significantly better candidate vs. baseline
  • 🟥 = significantly worse candidate vs. baseline

We compute a confidence interval (CI) over the relative difference of means between metrics from the candidate and baseline commits, considering the baseline as the reference.

If the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD), the change is considered significant.

Feel free to reach out to #apm-benchmarking-platform on Slack if you have any questions.

More details about the CI and significant changes

You can imagine this CI as a range of values that is likely to contain the true difference of means between the candidate and baseline commits.

CIs of the difference of means are often centered around 0%, because often changes are not that big:

---------------------------------(------|---^--------)-------------------------------->
                              -0.6%    0%  0.3%     +1.2%
                                 |          |        |
         lower bound of the CI --'          |        |
sample mean (center of the CI) -------------'        |
         upper bound of the CI ----------------------'

As described above, a change is considered significant if the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD).

For instance, for an execution time metric, this confidence interval indicates a significantly worse performance:

----------------------------------------|---------|---(---------^---------)---------->
                                       0%        1%  1.3%      2.2%      3.1%
                                                  |   |         |         |
       significant impact threshold --------------'   |         |         |
                      lower bound of CI --------------'         |         |
       sample mean (center of the CI) --------------------------'         |
                      upper bound of CI ----------------------------------'

scenario:thread_cpu/alloc_free/system/4096

  • 🟩 execution_time [-7.361ns; -7.154ns] or [-7.936%; -7.712%]

scenario:thread_cpu/profiler_attached/fast_path_system/4096

  • 🟩 execution_time [-12.078ns; -11.941ns] or [-11.535%; -11.404%]

Benchmark execution time: 2026-11-20 13:57:03

Comparing candidate commit 2abe6fe in PR branch gleocadie/PROF-16808-alloc-chaos-pilot with baseline commit 396d962 in branch main.

📊 Benchmarking dashboard

Found 2 performance improvements and 1 performance regressions! Performance is the same for 71 metrics, 24 unstable metrics.

Explanation

This is an A/B test comparing a candidate commit's performance against that of a baseline commit. Performance changes are noted in the tables below as:

  • 🟩 = significantly better candidate vs. baseline
  • 🟥 = significantly worse candidate vs. baseline

We compute a confidence interval (CI) over the relative difference of means between metrics from the candidate and baseline commits, considering the baseline as the reference.

If the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD), the change is considered significant.

Feel free to reach out to #apm-benchmarking-platform on Slack if you have any questions.

More details about the CI and significant changes

You can imagine this CI as a range of values that is likely to contain the true difference of means between the candidate and baseline commits.

CIs of the difference of means are often centered around 0%, because often changes are not that big:

---------------------------------(------|---^--------)-------------------------------->
                              -0.6%    0%  0.3%     +1.2%
                                 |          |        |
         lower bound of the CI --'          |        |
sample mean (center of the CI) -------------'        |
         upper bound of the CI ----------------------'

As described above, a change is considered significant if the CI is entirely outside the configured SIGNIFICANT_IMPACT_THRESHOLD (or the deprecated UNCONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD).

For instance, for an execution time metric, this confidence interval indicates a significantly worse performance:

----------------------------------------|---------|---(---------^---------)---------->
                                       0%        1%  1.3%      2.2%      3.1%
                                                  |   |         |         |
       significant impact threshold --------------'   |         |         |
                      lower bound of CI --------------'         |         |
       sample mean (center of the CI) --------------------------'         |
                      upper bound of CI ----------------------------------'

scenario:datadog_sample_span/complex_rule_partial_match/wall_time

  • 🟥 execution_time [+11.380ns; +11.597ns] or [+5.393%; +5.495%]

scenario:trace_buffer/4_senders/no_delay

  • 🟩 execution_time [-242.934µs; -222.423µs] or [-7.770%; -7.114%]
  • 🟩 throughput [+88485.702op/s; +96739.669op/s] or [+7.684%; +8.401%]

Unstable benchmarks

These benchmarks have a confidence interval too wide to call a change; treat them as noise rather than signal.

scenario:datadog_sample_span/complex_rule_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/complex_rule_partial_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+560.243%; -557.862%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/many_attributes_tag_rule/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+551.886%; -553.927%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/multiple_rules_first_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+544.200%; -550.340%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/multiple_rules_last_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/name_pattern_rule_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/name_pattern_rule_not_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+558.601%; -557.086%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/parent_not_sampled_short_circuit/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+556.288%; -555.995%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/parent_sampled_short_circuit/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+556.472%; -556.082%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/resource_pattern_rule_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+548.494%; -552.340%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/resource_pattern_rule_not_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+561.564%; -558.487%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/root_span_no_rules/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+566.225%; -560.700%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/service_rule_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+552.305%; -554.123%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/service_rule_not_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+560.381%; -557.927%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/tag_rule_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+559.340%; -557.435%]

scenario:datadog_sample_span/tag_rule_not_matching/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+563.027%; -559.181%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_case_insensitive_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_exact_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_exact_miss/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+542.737%; -549.662%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_wildcard_backtrack_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+557.393%; -556.516%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_wildcard_heavy_backtrack/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_wildcard_question_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+555.735%; -555.735%]

scenario:glob_matcher/ascii_wildcard_star_match/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+554.093%; -554.963%]

scenario:glob_matcher/star_short_circuit/allocated_bytes

  • unstable execution_time [-0.000ns; +0.000ns] or [+553.058%; -554.477%]

Candidate

Omitted due to size.

Baseline

Omitted due to size.

@datadog-datadog-prod-us1

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Artifact Size Benchmark Report

aarch64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 9.71 MB 9.71 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 101.91 MB 101.91 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 13.07 MB 13.07 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 113.12 MB 113.12 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
libdatadog-x64-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 30.35 MB 30.35 MB +0% (+512 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 122.00 KB 122.00 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 197.37 MB 197.40 MB +.01% (+24.00 KB) 🔍
/libdatadog-x64-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 819.89 MB 819.90 MB +0% (+8.78 KB) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 10.02 MB 10.02 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 122.00 KB 122.00 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 28.39 MB 28.38 MB --.02% (-8.00 KB) 💪
/libdatadog-x64-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 57.17 MB 57.17 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
libdatadog-x86-windows
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 26.78 MB 26.78 MB -0% (-512 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 123.84 KB 123.84 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 203.22 MB 203.22 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/debug/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 804.81 MB 804.82 MB +0% (+2.92 KB) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.dll 7.72 MB 7.72 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 123.84 KB 123.84 KB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/dynamic/datadog_profiling_ffi.pdb 30.53 MB 30.53 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/libdatadog-x86-windows/release/static/datadog_profiling_ffi.lib 53.97 MB 53.97 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
x86_64-alpine-linux-musl
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 91.68 MB 91.68 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/x86_64-alpine-linux-musl/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 10.56 MB 10.56 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
Artifact Baseline Commit Change
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.a 107.39 MB 107.39 MB 0% (0 B) 👌
/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/lib/libdatadog_profiling.so 12.95 MB 12.95 MB 0% (0 B) 👌

Run ddog_Vec_Tag_push in one-shot and sticky modes for an empty vector, a
vector at capacity, and a long key and value. Crash outcomes are recorded
with the stack and the owned call site, and do not fail the test.

Jira: PROF-16808
The test-only feature shares one policy and event counter between logical arena requests and backing-chunk growth, so those failures can be enumerated without changing production types.

Jira: PROF-16808
Move the arena chaos wrappers from libdd-alloc into a crate-private
module of libdd-profiling, compiled only under the
allocation_chaos_test cfg (LIBDD_ALLOCATION_CHAOS_TEST=1). Drop the
allocation-chaos-test Cargo features so published crates gain no
public items or features. The harness reaches the observer through a
cfg-gated extern static and builds its own arena wrappers.

Jira: PROF-16808

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