From 75f220ce5c9643815937c12f656c479fbd20ad89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerrrt Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:37:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] docs(eden): record the first collection and what collecting really took MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The rebuilt guest's graph was empty until a SharpHound run was ingested on 2026-11-16 (370 nodes, 3914 edges). build-the-bloodhound-guest.md §7 now records the population user and its phoenix-printed password, that Defender catches SharpHound through AMSI (and the detection is the SOC signal, left in place), that the network collectors cannot work against DCs that enforce LDAP signing with no LDAPS cert, and that the UI is Hicks-only for upload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 --- docs/changelog.md | 23 +++++++++++++++ docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/changelog.md b/docs/changelog.md index ad632ed8..2a027510 100644 --- a/docs/changelog.md +++ b/docs/changelog.md @@ -19,6 +19,29 @@ docstring gives: it is a record, not a claim about now. ## 2026-11-16 +- **`eden`'s first collection, and how it was really done.** The rebuilt + guest held an empty graph (1 node, 0 edges) until a SharpHound run was + ingested on 2026-11-16: 370 nodes and 3,914 edges — 48 users, 73 groups, + the 6 domain computers, 14 OUs, 5 GPOs and the domain. `build-the-bloodhound-guest.md` + §7 now records the three things the run hit, none of which the old three-line + step mentioned: + - **Collected from `carbuncle` as `AD\acooper`**, a population user + (#449) whose password `population-credentials.yml` prints on `phoenix`, + signed in at the console because a plain user is not in *Remote Desktop + Users*. + - **Defender quarantines SharpHound through AMSI**, as the assembly loads, + so a folder exclusion does not help; a process exclusion or turning + real-time protection off for the run in the Windows Security UI does. The + detection was left in place: SharpHound caught on a workstation, logged + against the user, is the SOC event #266 is built to raise. + - **The network collectors cannot work here.** `bloodhound-ce-python` and + `netexec` both authenticate as `acooper`, but the DCs enforce LDAP signing + and have no LDAPS certificate (the lab runs no AD CS): signing refuses + plain LDAP and `636` has no cert, so neither collects. SharpHound on a + domain host is the only path, because the Windows LDAP client signs and + seals over `389`. The zip was carried to a Hicks workstation to upload, + since the UI answers Hicks alone. + - **No clone of template 901 puts its user in `lxd`.** A second live re-check of `eden` found `garnet` in the `lxd` group, from the default user groups in Ubuntu's `/etc/cloud/cloud.cfg`. LXD is not installed on diff --git a/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md b/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md index 8aa52cdc..2091416b 100644 --- a/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md +++ b/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md @@ -391,8 +391,36 @@ containers to come back. They have `restart: unless-stopped`. .\SharpHound.exe -c All --domain ad.matrix.elysium --zipfilename eden-first.zip ``` - Then upload the zip under *Administration → File Ingest*. The job must - finish **Complete**, not *Partially Complete*. + The user is any of the population (#449), say `AD\acooper`; its password is + printed on `phoenix` by `ansible-playbook population-credentials.yml -e + population_only=acooper`, never stored. Sign in at `carbuncle`'s console + (Proxmox, VMID 154), since a plain domain user is not in *Remote Desktop + Users*. + + Three things the first run (2026-11-16) hit, so a later one need not: + + - **Defender quarantines SharpHound through AMSI**, as it loads, not on + disk — so a folder exclusion does not help; a process exclusion for + `SharpHound.exe`, or turning real-time protection off for the run in the + Windows Security UI, does. Tamper Protection means this is a UI action, + not a `Set-MpPreference` one. **Leave the detection in place**: SharpHound + caught on a workstation, logged against the user, is the event the SOC + side of the lab exists to raise (#266), not something to clear. Re-enable + protection after. + - **The network collectors do not work here.** `bloodhound-ce-python` and + `netexec` authenticate, but both DCs enforce LDAP signing and have no + LDAPS certificate (the lab runs no AD CS), so neither can collect: + signing refuses plain LDAP, and `636` has no cert. SharpHound on a + domain host is the only path, because the Windows LDAP client signs and + seals over `389` natively. Do not re-walk the Linux route. + - **The UI answers Hicks only** (`403` from VLAN 30, §6), so `carbuncle`'s + own browser cannot upload. Carry the zip to a Hicks workstation — over + RDP, or `scp` through `phoenix` — and upload it there. + + Upload the zip under *Administration → File Ingest*. The job must finish + **Complete**, not *Partially Complete*. Then delete every copy of the zip: + it is a map of the domain's weaknesses, and the audit counts none outside + `/srv/bloodhound-data`. 3. **A graph with edges in it.** In *Explore*, search `DOMAIN ADMINS@AD.MATRIX.ELYSIUM` and open *Members*. Then run the pre-built query *Shortest paths to Domain Admins*. Before #449's From 52ae3586978aa710098df4265e938c6400e80d2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gerrrt Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:32:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] =?UTF-8?q?docs(eden):=20make=20the=20collection=20run?= =?UTF-8?q?book's=20=C2=A77=20step=20actually=20executable?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Address Copilot's review of #1538: - population-credentials.yml needs the checkout's ansible/ directory and the exported proxmox env (ansible/README.md); the earlier repo-root shell has neither. Give the full preamble. - AD\acooper is an ordinary user and cannot change Defender. Elevate as the endpoint's local labadmin for the exclusion / RT toggle, then collect back in acooper's session, and remove the process exclusion afterwards (not just re-enable protection). - RDP is off on all six guests and acooper has no SSH key, so carbuncle cannot be reached that way. Deliver SharpHound to carbuncle and pull the zip back with phoenix-initiated scp as the built-in Administrator, naming the key and the archive path. Refs #1538. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 --- docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md | 57 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md b/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md index 2091416b..edca1481 100644 --- a/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md +++ b/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md @@ -383,39 +383,64 @@ containers to come back. They have `restart: unless-stopped`. it sits in `.env` and in the container's environment, which anyone in the `docker` group can read, and must not stay the live login. 2. **A collection, ingested.** Download SharpHound from the UI, under - *Download Collectors*. That way its version is the one the server's schema - expects. Run it from a domain-joined host as an ordinary domain user, for - example from `carbuncle`: + *Download Collectors*, so its version is the one the server's schema + expects. The UI answers Hicks only (`403` from VLAN 30, §6), so download it + on a Hicks workstation and carry it to `carbuncle`: `scp` it through + `phoenix` to `Administrator@10.0.30.54` (phoenix's `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` + reaches every guest as the built-in Administrator; `carbuncle` is VMID 154). + Run it there as an ordinary domain user: ```powershell .\SharpHound.exe -c All --domain ad.matrix.elysium --zipfilename eden-first.zip ``` - The user is any of the population (#449), say `AD\acooper`; its password is - printed on `phoenix` by `ansible-playbook population-credentials.yml -e - population_only=acooper`, never stored. Sign in at `carbuncle`'s console - (Proxmox, VMID 154), since a plain domain user is not in *Remote Desktop - Users*. + The user is any of the population (#449), say `AD\acooper`. Its password is + printed on `phoenix`, never stored — but `population-credentials.yml` reads + `ansible.cfg` and the `LAB_POPULATION_SEED` it derives the password from + from the checkout's `ansible/` directory, so run it from there with the + proxmox env exported, as `ansible/README.md` sets up: + + ```bash + set -a; . ~/.config/proxmox/phoenix.env; set +a + cd ansible + ansible-playbook population-credentials.yml -e population_only=acooper + ``` + + The earlier repo-root shell will not find the playbook. Sign in at + `carbuncle`'s console (Proxmox, VMID 154): RDP is off on all six guests, so + a domain user has no remote session to use. Three things the first run (2026-11-16) hit, so a later one need not: - **Defender quarantines SharpHound through AMSI**, as it loads, not on disk — so a folder exclusion does not help; a process exclusion for `SharpHound.exe`, or turning real-time protection off for the run in the - Windows Security UI, does. Tamper Protection means this is a UI action, - not a `Set-MpPreference` one. **Leave the detection in place**: SharpHound - caught on a workstation, logged against the user, is the event the SOC - side of the lab exists to raise (#266), not something to clear. Re-enable - protection after. + Windows Security UI, does. `AD\acooper` is an ordinary user and cannot + change Defender: make the change elevated as the endpoint's local + administrator `labadmin` (its password is `LAB_ENDPOINT_ADMIN_PASSWORD`), + then run SharpHound back in `acooper`'s own session. Tamper Protection + means this is a UI action, not a `Set-MpPreference` one. **Leave the + detection in place**: SharpHound caught on a workstation, logged against + the user, is the event the SOC side of the lab exists to raise (#266), + not something to clear. Afterwards undo exactly what you changed — + re-enable real-time protection, and if you added the process exclusion, + remove it, because re-enabling protection does not clear an exclusion. - **The network collectors do not work here.** `bloodhound-ce-python` and `netexec` authenticate, but both DCs enforce LDAP signing and have no LDAPS certificate (the lab runs no AD CS), so neither can collect: signing refuses plain LDAP, and `636` has no cert. SharpHound on a domain host is the only path, because the Windows LDAP client signs and seals over `389` natively. Do not re-walk the Linux route. - - **The UI answers Hicks only** (`403` from VLAN 30, §6), so `carbuncle`'s - own browser cannot upload. Carry the zip to a Hicks workstation — over - RDP, or `scp` through `phoenix` — and upload it there. + - **Getting the zip to the UI.** `carbuncle`'s own browser cannot upload + (Hicks only, above), and RDP is off, so pull the zip off `carbuncle` from + `phoenix` with `scp` as the built-in Administrator — `acooper` has no SSH + key, phoenix's `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` does — then carry it to a Hicks + workstation and upload it there. From the checkout root on `phoenix`: + + ```bash + scp -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -o UserKnownHostsFile=ansible/.known_hosts \ + Administrator@10.0.30.54:'C:/Users/acooper/eden-first.zip' . + ``` Upload the zip under *Administration → File Ingest*. The job must finish **Complete**, not *Partially Complete*. Then delete every copy of the zip: