diff --git a/docs/changelog.md b/docs/changelog.md index ad632ed8..2a027510 100644 --- a/docs/changelog.md +++ b/docs/changelog.md @@ -19,6 +19,29 @@ docstring gives: it is a record, not a claim about now. ## 2026-11-16 +- **`eden`'s first collection, and how it was really done.** The rebuilt + guest held an empty graph (1 node, 0 edges) until a SharpHound run was + ingested on 2026-11-16: 370 nodes and 3,914 edges — 48 users, 73 groups, + the 6 domain computers, 14 OUs, 5 GPOs and the domain. `build-the-bloodhound-guest.md` + §7 now records the three things the run hit, none of which the old three-line + step mentioned: + - **Collected from `carbuncle` as `AD\acooper`**, a population user + (#449) whose password `population-credentials.yml` prints on `phoenix`, + signed in at the console because a plain user is not in *Remote Desktop + Users*. + - **Defender quarantines SharpHound through AMSI**, as the assembly loads, + so a folder exclusion does not help; a process exclusion or turning + real-time protection off for the run in the Windows Security UI does. The + detection was left in place: SharpHound caught on a workstation, logged + against the user, is the SOC event #266 is built to raise. + - **The network collectors cannot work here.** `bloodhound-ce-python` and + `netexec` both authenticate as `acooper`, but the DCs enforce LDAP signing + and have no LDAPS certificate (the lab runs no AD CS): signing refuses + plain LDAP and `636` has no cert, so neither collects. SharpHound on a + domain host is the only path, because the Windows LDAP client signs and + seals over `389`. The zip was carried to a Hicks workstation to upload, + since the UI answers Hicks alone. + - **No clone of template 901 puts its user in `lxd`.** A second live re-check of `eden` found `garnet` in the `lxd` group, from the default user groups in Ubuntu's `/etc/cloud/cloud.cfg`. LXD is not installed on diff --git a/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md b/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md index 8aa52cdc..edca1481 100644 --- a/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md +++ b/docs/runbooks/build-the-bloodhound-guest.md @@ -383,16 +383,69 @@ containers to come back. They have `restart: unless-stopped`. it sits in `.env` and in the container's environment, which anyone in the `docker` group can read, and must not stay the live login. 2. **A collection, ingested.** Download SharpHound from the UI, under - *Download Collectors*. That way its version is the one the server's schema - expects. Run it from a domain-joined host as an ordinary domain user, for - example from `carbuncle`: + *Download Collectors*, so its version is the one the server's schema + expects. The UI answers Hicks only (`403` from VLAN 30, §6), so download it + on a Hicks workstation and carry it to `carbuncle`: `scp` it through + `phoenix` to `Administrator@10.0.30.54` (phoenix's `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` + reaches every guest as the built-in Administrator; `carbuncle` is VMID 154). + Run it there as an ordinary domain user: ```powershell .\SharpHound.exe -c All --domain ad.matrix.elysium --zipfilename eden-first.zip ``` - Then upload the zip under *Administration → File Ingest*. The job must - finish **Complete**, not *Partially Complete*. + The user is any of the population (#449), say `AD\acooper`. Its password is + printed on `phoenix`, never stored — but `population-credentials.yml` reads + `ansible.cfg` and the `LAB_POPULATION_SEED` it derives the password from + from the checkout's `ansible/` directory, so run it from there with the + proxmox env exported, as `ansible/README.md` sets up: + + ```bash + set -a; . ~/.config/proxmox/phoenix.env; set +a + cd ansible + ansible-playbook population-credentials.yml -e population_only=acooper + ``` + + The earlier repo-root shell will not find the playbook. Sign in at + `carbuncle`'s console (Proxmox, VMID 154): RDP is off on all six guests, so + a domain user has no remote session to use. + + Three things the first run (2026-11-16) hit, so a later one need not: + + - **Defender quarantines SharpHound through AMSI**, as it loads, not on + disk — so a folder exclusion does not help; a process exclusion for + `SharpHound.exe`, or turning real-time protection off for the run in the + Windows Security UI, does. `AD\acooper` is an ordinary user and cannot + change Defender: make the change elevated as the endpoint's local + administrator `labadmin` (its password is `LAB_ENDPOINT_ADMIN_PASSWORD`), + then run SharpHound back in `acooper`'s own session. Tamper Protection + means this is a UI action, not a `Set-MpPreference` one. **Leave the + detection in place**: SharpHound caught on a workstation, logged against + the user, is the event the SOC side of the lab exists to raise (#266), + not something to clear. Afterwards undo exactly what you changed — + re-enable real-time protection, and if you added the process exclusion, + remove it, because re-enabling protection does not clear an exclusion. + - **The network collectors do not work here.** `bloodhound-ce-python` and + `netexec` authenticate, but both DCs enforce LDAP signing and have no + LDAPS certificate (the lab runs no AD CS), so neither can collect: + signing refuses plain LDAP, and `636` has no cert. SharpHound on a + domain host is the only path, because the Windows LDAP client signs and + seals over `389` natively. Do not re-walk the Linux route. + - **Getting the zip to the UI.** `carbuncle`'s own browser cannot upload + (Hicks only, above), and RDP is off, so pull the zip off `carbuncle` from + `phoenix` with `scp` as the built-in Administrator — `acooper` has no SSH + key, phoenix's `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` does — then carry it to a Hicks + workstation and upload it there. From the checkout root on `phoenix`: + + ```bash + scp -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -o UserKnownHostsFile=ansible/.known_hosts \ + Administrator@10.0.30.54:'C:/Users/acooper/eden-first.zip' . + ``` + + Upload the zip under *Administration → File Ingest*. The job must finish + **Complete**, not *Partially Complete*. Then delete every copy of the zip: + it is a map of the domain's weaknesses, and the audit counts none outside + `/srv/bloodhound-data`. 3. **A graph with edges in it.** In *Explore*, search `DOMAIN ADMINS@AD.MATRIX.ELYSIUM` and open *Members*. Then run the pre-built query *Shortest paths to Domain Admins*. Before #449's